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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how to reverse deflation to inflation. Once deflation takes root, it is not 
easy to reverse because of the zero lower bound in nominal interest rates. My model indicates 
that there are two steady states where both inflation/deflation (i.e., changes in prices) and real 
activity (i.e., quantities) remain unchanged: that is, there are inflationary and deflationary steady 
states. The model indicates that, to switch a deflationary steady state to an inflationary steady 
state, a central bank needs to influence the time preference rates of the government and the 
representative household. It is not easy, however, to do so, and the best way of switching 
deflation to inflation may be to wait for a lucky event (i.e., an exogenous shock). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification code: E31, E52, E58 
Keywords: Deflation; The zero lower bound; Monetary policies; Quantitative easing; Time 
preference 
                                                                  
*Correspondence: Taiji HARASHIMA, Kanazawa Seiryo University, 10-1 Goshomachi-Ushi, 
Kanazawa-shi, Ishikawa, 920-8620, Japan.  
Email: harashim@seiryo-u.ac.jp or t-harashima@mve.biglobe.ne.jp.  
 1 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Reversing deflation to inflation has been an important policy issue, especially since the 1990s, 
because some economies have experienced deflation (although temporary) and faced the zero 
lower bound (ZLB) in nominal interest rates. Although inflation is now tamed in most 
developed countries, deflation remains a concern. For example, deflation has haunted Japan 
since the 1990s, although the Bank of Japan has repeatedly tried to reverse the course of 
deflation, even by using unconventional monetary policies. Once deflation takes root, however, 
it is not easy to reverse because of ZLB. If nominal interest rates are stuck at or near zero, 
conventional monetary policies (i.e., manipulations of nominal interest rates by a central bank) 
are little effective.  
 An alternative tool to reverse deflation is needed. An important prospective alternative 
tool is to influence households’ expectations (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Bernanke 
and Reinhart, 2004; Bernanke et al., 2004; Blinder et al., 2008). However, theoretically, the 
effectiveness of this measure is ambiguous. In this paper, I examine the feasibility and 
effectiveness of manipulating expectations on the basis of the inflation/deflation model shown 
by Harashima (2004b, 2008, 2015a), as well as conventional inflation models—in particular, 
new-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) models.  
 The inflation/deflation model of Harashima (2004b, 2008, 2015a) is based on a 
micro-foundation of trend inflation. It indicates that trend inflation is generated by the 
difference between the rate of time preference (RTP) of the government and that of the 
representative household (RTP RH). In addition, both the RTP of the government and the RTP 
RH are intrinsically temporally variable. Hence, the expectations of both RTPs’ future values 
must be generated by households. The feasibility and effectiveness of expectation manipulation 
therefore depends on whether a central bank can influence the RTP expectations of both the 
government and the RH.     
 Even if nominal interest rates are bounded by ZLB, an economy can be stable if the 
absolute value of the deflation rate equals the real rate of interest, because the Fisher equation is 
satisfied. If households generate expectations of the government’s RTP and the RTP RH that are 
consistent with this deflation rate, the economy will be stable. To reverse deflation to inflation, 
therefore, households’ expectations of deflation need to be changed. There are several possible 
ways to influence households’ expectations: verbal intervention, quantitative easing (QE), 
renouncing central bank independence, raising the nominal interest rate, and depreciating the 
exchange rate. In addition, imposing taxes on money may be used to reverse deflation, although 
the main aim in that case is not to influence households’ expectations but to recover the ability 
to manipulate nominal interest rates. In this paper, I examine and evaluate the feasibilities and 
effectiveness of these measures. The results of examinations indicate that it is not easy for a 
central bank to reverse deflation to inflation by influencing households’ expectations. This 
conclusion suggests that as inflation shows signs of changing to deflation, it is important for a 
central bank to act quickly and drastically, for example, by increasing the target rate of inflation 
and lowering nominal interest rates far more than it usually would (e.g., Williams, 2009).  
 
2  A MECHANISM OF DEFLATION 
 
2.1  The law of motion for inflation/deflation  
2.1.1  The law of motion 
The model constructed by Harashima (2004b, 2008, 2015a) is used as the inflation/deflation 
model in this paper. The details of the model are explained in Appendix A. The difference 
between it and conventional inflation models—particularly NKPC models—is discussed in 
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Section 2.1.5. The model indicates that the law of motion for inflation/deflation is described by  
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where πt is the inflation/deflation rate at time t, θG is the RTP of government, and θP is RTP RH. 
θG and θP are not necessarily identical. Equation (1) is the same as equation (A19) in Appendix 
A. It indicates that inflation/deflation accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government 
and the representative household reconciling the contradiction in their heterogeneous RTPs. A 
solution of the integral in equation (1) for given θG and θP is 
 
  20 6 tθθππ PGt   .                          (2) 
 
Generally, the path of inflation/deflation that satisfies equation (1) for t0 is expressed as 
 
      tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60   , 
 
where zt is a time-dependent variable. The stream of zt varies depending on the boundary 
condition. However, if πt satisfies equation (1) for t0 , and  tπ for 11  t , then  
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The proof is shown by Harashima (2008). Any inflation/deflation path that satisfies equation (1) 
for t0 therefore asymptotically approaches the path of equation (2).  
 Equation (2) indicates a trend component in inflation/deflation. In addition to this 
trend element, actual inflation/deflation will be influenced by output gaps and various 
disturbances in the short run; thus, an aggregate supply equation (a Phillips curve) consists of 
those elements as well as the trend component. The model of inflation therefore consists of an 
aggregate supply equation (which consists of equation [2] as the trend component, output gaps, 
and various disturbances), an aggregate demand equation, and an instrument rule for the central 
bank’s manipulation of nominal interest rates (e.g., a Taylor rule). See Harashima (2008) for the 
detailed model structure. 
  If a central bank is sufficiently independent, it can force the government to change θG 
and achieve θG = θP. If θG = θP is kept, inflation/deflation neither accelerates nor decelerates by 
equation (1). In other words, to stabilize inflation, an independent central bank will punish the 
government (i.e., force it to change its preference θG) if θG deviates from θP. 
 
2.1.2  Stationarity 
Output gaps and disturbances are basically stationary processes. Therefore, if θG = θP is kept, πt 
– π0 is basically a stationary process with a mean of 0; that is, inflation/deflation becomes a 
stationary process with mean π0 because, if θG = θP, the trend component disappears (i.e., πt = 0 
in equation [2]). For example, when θG = θP begins to be kept, πt is negative (e.g., –0.8% or π0 = 
–0.008). An average deflation rate of –0.8% then will continue because θG = θP is kept. The 
deflation rate may frequently temporarily deviate from –0.8% because of various shocks, but it 
will soon return to –0.8%.  
 Trends or unit roots in inflation were clearly observed during the great inflation in the 
1960s and 1970s, but they are not clear in the current periods of low inflation. The reason for 
this lack of clarity (in other words, stationarity) is that central banks currently are sufficiently 
independent and θG = θP is always kept.  
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2.1.3 Necessity of generating an expected θG 
All households behave (i.e., choose their optimal paths) on the basis of the expectation of future 
inflation/deflation. The model shown in Section 2.1.1 indicates that, to expect future 
inflation/deflation, households must know the future value of the government’s RTP (θG). There 
is, however, no guarantee that θG and RTP RH will be constant across time; rather, the RTPs of 
the government and households will be intrinsically temporally variable. However, households 
cannot directly know even the current value of θG, because households and the government are 
different entities and do not inherently know each other’s preferences. Therefore, households 
must somehow generate expectations of the future values of θG by calculating them using a 
structural model of the government’s RTP, but they first must construct such a model. A model 
of the government’ RTP and the various problems that are created when generating the expected 
RTP of government are presented by Harashima (2015b) and also in Appendix B. 
 Equation (2) indicates that πt depends on θG. Therefore, households need to generate 
an expected inflation/deflation by generating an expected θG. That is, the need to generate an 
expected inflation/deflation necessitates the expectation of θG. This means that, if a central bank 
can influence the expected θG, it can also influence the expected inflation/deflation.  
 
2.1.4  Necessity of generating an expected θP  
As Becker (1980) and Harashima (2014a, b) indicate, it is not possible to assume that the 
representative household is the same as the average household in dynamic models. Harashima 
(2014a, b) shows an alternative definition of the representative household such that the behavior 
of the representative household is defined as the collective behavior of all households under 
sustainable heterogeneity. The reason why this alternative definition is needed, and the nature of 
sustainable heterogeneity, are shown in detail in Appendix C. Unlike the case in which the 
representative household is assumed to be the average household, this alternatively defined 
representative household reaches a steady state in which all households satisfy all of their 
optimality conditions in dynamic models, even if the households are heterogeneous. In addition, 
the alternatively defined representative household has an RTP that is equal to the average RTP 
as shown in equations (C7) and (C8) in Appendix C. This alternatively defined representative 
household requires that each household must generate its expected RTP RH ex ante for it to 
behave optimally, as shown in Appendix C (see also Harashima, 2014a, b).  
 Equation (2) indicates that πt depends not only on θG but also on θP. Therefore, 
households need to generate their expected levels of inflation/deflation by generating not only 
an expected θG but also an expected θP. Similar to the case of θG, if a central bank can influence 
the expected θP, it can also influence the expected inflation/deflation.  
 
2.1.5  Comparison with conventional inflation models 
A typical hybrid NKPC (e.g., Galí et al., 2005), is  
 
ttxtt|tt εxαπαπαπ   1111                        (3) 
 
where xt is the output gap and εt is an i.i.d. shock with a zero mean at time t, t|tπ 1 πt is the rate 
of inflation at time t + 1 expected at time t, and απ+1, απ-1, and αx are constant coefficients. 
Hybrid NKPC inflation models consist of an aggregate supply equation (a Phillips curve) such 
as that expressed in equation (3), an aggregate demand equation, and an instrument rule for the 
central bank’s manipulation of nominal interest rates (e.g., a Taylor rule). 
 An important difference between the model shown in Section 2.1.1 and the hybrid 
NKPC inflation model shown here is whether or not a mechanism that generates a trend or unit 
root is explicitly incorporated on the basis of a micro-foundation. In the model in Section 2.1.1, 
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a trend or unit root is generated naturally if
PG θθ  by the law of motion for inflation/deflation. 
In the hybrid NKPC model, however, an ad hoc inclusion of a backward-looking element (πt-1) 
is needed to generate a trend or unit root. 
 Nevertheless, if the backward-looking element (πt-1) is excluded from equation (3) (i.e., 
the hybrid NKPC is reduced to a pure NKPC), inflation also shows stationarity when
PG θθ
ˆˆ  , 
where
Gθˆ is the expected θG and Pθˆ is the expected θP. Hence, if PG θθ
ˆˆ  , the performances of 
the model in Section 2.1.1 and the pure NKPC model will be almost the same. However, there is 
still an important difference between the two models. The expected inflation/deflation depends 
on the expectations of θG and θP in the model in Section 2.1.1, whereas the expected 
inflation/deflation depends on expected future disturbances in the pure NKPC model.  
 
2.2  The zero lower bound (ZLB) 
Assume that the central bank is sufficiently independent and capable. Therefore, the central 
bank always keeps
PG θθ
ˆˆ  and inflation/deflation is a stationary process with mean π0. The 
assumption of a sufficiently independent central bank is natural in most developed countries at 
the present time. 
 Suppose that there is a downward shock on expected θP and then PG θθ
ˆˆ  in equation 
(2). By the law of motion for inflation/deflation, inflation begins to accelerate (or deflation 
begins to decelerate). To restore
PG θθ
ˆˆ  , the central bank forces the government to lower θG 
by increasing nominal interest rates, and the government has no choice but to lower θG. As a 
result,
PG θθ
ˆˆ  is soon attained. However, because of the shock on the expected θP and the 
consequent change of θG, π0 changes. To achieve
*ππ 0 , where π
* is the central bank’s target 
rate of inflation, therefore, the central bank needs to further manipulate nominal interest rates 
and θG. After achieving
*ππ 0 , the central bank keeps PG θθ
ˆˆ  .   
 Now suppose that there is an upward shock on expected θP, and then PG θθ
ˆˆ  in 
equation (2). By the law of motion for inflation/deflation, inflation begins to decelerate (or 
deflation begins to accelerate). To restore
PG θθ
ˆˆ  , the central bank forces the government to 
raise θG by decreasing nominal interest rates. The government has no choice but to raise θG, but 
the recovery of PG θθ
ˆˆ  is not necessarily guaranteed, because the central bank cannot lower 
nominal interest rates below the ZLB.1 If nominal interest rates are bounded by the ZLB, the 
central bank no longer has the power to force the government to raise θG by manipulating 
nominal interest rates. Unlike the case of a downward shock on the expected θP, the capability 
of the central bank is constrained by the ZLB. As a result, 
PG θθ
ˆˆ  is not necessarily restored 
and
PG θθ
ˆˆ  may continue. In this case, inflation eventually changes to deflation and deflation 
accelerates.  
  
2.3  Households’ expectation of θG = θP 
How do households think the government behaves when nominal interest rates are bounded by 
the ZLB? They may perceive that, because the central bank is now powerless, the government 
will freely choose θG, and that it will behave on the basis of its intrinsic θG. They may also think 
                                                          
1 Technically, central banks can make nominal interest rates slightly negative as the Bank of Japan and 
the European Central Bank did. Of course, however, these slightly negative interest rates do not indicate 
that ZLB does not exist.  
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that θG is still influenced by the central bank in the sense that, when deflation eventually 
changes to inflation, the central bank will certainly and immediately resume control of θG by 
manipulating nominal interest rates. For example, if the government behaves on the basis of 
intrinsic θG, deflation soon changes to inflation because θG > θP intrinsically. Therefore, 
manipulations of nominal interest rates become effective again and θG can be controlled by the 
central bank as it was before. This second view indicates that the ZLB does not mean that the 
government can freely act on its own intrinsic RTP forever, but that it can merely temporarily 
escape from the discipline of the central bank. Which view is correct? 
 
2.3.1  Habituation 
People dislike changing their own preferences. Hence, people and governments feel 
psychological pain and disutility if their preferences are forced to change. On the other hand, 
studies on habituation in psychology (e.g., Thompson and Spencer, 1966; Groves and 
Thompson, 1970; Rankin et al., 2009) imply that once a preference is changed, the initial 
psychological pain will gradually subside as the person acclimates to the change: that is, the 
psychological pain will persist but dwindle. According to Rankin et al. (2009), one of the 
common characteristics of habituation is that repeated application of a stimulus results in a 
progressive decrease in some parameter of a response to an asymptotic level. Although the 
psychological pain or a feeling of wrongness may never disappear completely, the level of 
psychological pain will gradually recede as time passes. Huge initial psychological pains and 
later acclimation will have an important effect on the discipline of the central bank, because the 
government will decide its behavior on the basis of its own expectations. 
 
2.3.2  Inhibitory effect 
Suppose that a government is considering whether it would be better to behave on its intrinsic 
θG (i.e., Gθ ) or on the θG that is equal to θP when nominal interest rates are zero. Unlike in 
“usual” inflation periods, the government has a choice, because nominal interest rates are zero. 
If it chooses to behave on Gθ , it can relieve the persisting but dwindling psychological pain 
(disutility) caused by the last forced change in θG (i.e., by the last punishment), but it will suffer 
great psychological pain in the near future because behaving on Gθ indicates the reversal of 
deflation to inflation (because Gθ > θP by nature) in the near future and the consequent 
resumption of enforcement (or punishment) by the independent central bank to change θG from 
Gθ to θP. The government can enjoy its intrinsic preference only for a short period and soon 
will have to endure great psychological pains again. On the other hand, if the government 
continues to behave on θG = θP, it will not suffer great psychological pains in the near future 
even though it has to continue feeling the relatively small and subsiding psychological pains 
caused by the last forced change in θG (i.e., by the last punishment).  
 Which of the two options a government chooses depends on the level of the initial 
psychological pain and that of the dwindling psychological pain as time passes. If the initial 
psychological pain is far larger than the dwindling psychological pain, the government will not 
change to behaving on Gθ and will keep θG = θP. Let Pains,t be the disutility of a forced change 
in θG in period t where the last forced change in θG is undertaken in period s. A larger (positive) 
value of Pains,t indicates a larger magnitude of disutility. It is assumed that 0
,

dt
dPain ts for t ≥ 
s because the initial psychological pain gradually subsides. 
 Suppose that deflation sets in and nominal interest rates become zero in period v. 
Suppose also that, if the government changes θG from θP to Gθ in period v, deflation reverses to 
 6 
inflation and the central bank resumes forcing the government to change θG from Gθ to θP in 
period w where s < v < w. The expected disutility of the government generated in period v if it 
changes θG from θP to Gθ in period v is therefore 
 
      dtpainwtθdtpainvtθ
w
twG,t
w
v
tsG,t 

 ,, expexp  
               dtpainwtθdtpainvt
w
twP
w
v
tsG 

 ,, expexp   
 
where θG,t = Gθ for v ≤ t < w and θG,t = θP for w ≤ t, because the government enjoys its intrinsic 
preference during v ≤ t < w. On the other hand, if the government does not change θG from θP 
to Gθ , its expected disutility generated in period v is    
  
    


v
tsG , t dtpainvtθ ,exp  
  


v
tsP dtpainvtθ ,exp  
 
where θG,t = θP for any t (≥ v) because the government continues to obey the central bank.  
 If the disutility in the former case is larger than that in the latter case—that is, if  
 
      dtpainwtθdtpainvt
w
twP
w
v
tsG 

 ,, expexp   
  


v
tsP dtpainvtθ ,exp ,                                      (4) 
 
—then the government will not change θG from θP to Gθ and thus θG = θP is basically kept even 
although nominal interest rates are zero and the central bank cannot directly deter the 
government from changing θG from θP to Gθ . Because 0
,

dt
dPain ts , then tstw painpain ,,   
for t > v, and therefore the probability that inequality (4) holds will not be low. If the value of 
 
dt
sdPaint is relatively large—that is, if the initial psychological pain soon subsides—then 
inequality (4) will usually hold and the change of θG from θP to Gθ will be always inhibited. 
Because people will acclimate to the psychological pain, as noted in Section 2.3.1, it is likely 
that the inhibitory effect usually influences the government’s behavior. 
 The independence of the central bank (in other words, presumable punishments by the 
central bank) therefore will possess an inhibitory effect, because even if the central bank cannot 
manipulate nominal interest rates and directly deter the government from changing θG from θP 
to Gθ because of ZLB, the government can be still nearly completely under the control of the 
central bank.   
 
2.3.3  PG θθ
ˆˆ  , even during deflation 
If households firmly believe that the central bank is sufficiently independent and the inhibitory 
effect is important in controlling the government’s behavior, households will expect that the 
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government will continue to keep θG = θP, even if nominal interest rates are zero. Therefore, 
households will basically generate
PG θθ
ˆˆ  even during deflation if the central bank is 
sufficiently independent. In the early periods after an upward shock on
Pθˆ , households may 
temporarily generate
PG θθ
ˆˆ  , but they will soon return to PG θθ
ˆˆ  . This expectation of θG = 
θP even during deflation is an important factor that makes controlling deflation difficult, as will 
be shown in later in this section. 
 
2.4  Inflationary and deflationary steady states 
2.4.1  Two steady states 
A steady state in which both real activity (quantities) and inflation/deflation (changes in prices) 
stay unchanged requires two conditions, rθP  and PG θθ
ˆˆ  , where r is the real rate of 
interest at steady state. As is well known, rθP  is the condition for a steady state of 
quantities (e.g., Fisher, 1930).
PG θθ
ˆˆ  is the condition for a steady state of inflation/deflation 
according to the law of motion for inflation/deflation. As shown in Section 2.3,
PG θθ
ˆˆ  will be 
kept even during deflation if the central bank is sufficiently independent.  
 For both rθP  and PG θθ
ˆˆ  to be simultaneously satisfied, π0 in equation (2) needs 
to take an appropriate value. Among the various possible values, the state that satisfies  
 
(a) *ππ 0  
 
is a steady state, which I call an inflationary steady state. Inflation is stabilized at the target rate 
of the central bank (π*). However, if deflation is also considered, another π0 that is consistent 
with both
PG θθ
ˆˆ  and rθP  can exist, such that  
 
(b) rπ 0  , 
 
which I call a deflationary steady state. The two steady states are identical except for the 
inflation/deflation rate.  
 In addition to the nature that
PG θθ
ˆˆ  even during deflation, the existence of a 
deflationary steady state (b) is another important factor that makes controlling deflation difficult. 
A deflationary steady state (b) can be chosen only when the nominal interest rate is zero (in 
other worlds, during deflation) because, if nominal interest rates are above zero, the central bank 
can manipulate nominal interest rates to achieve state (a). On the other hand, rθP  cannot 
necessarily be satisfied for any value of π0. If, and only if, state (b) is chosen (i.e., if and only 
if rπ 0 ), the condition rθP  is satisfied when the nominal interest rates are zero. 
Therefore, a deflationary steady state (b) can compete with an inflationary steady state (a) as the 
steady state once nominal interest rates are stuck at ZLB.  
 Note that the two steady states are also the only possible steady states in NKPC 
models. If nominal interest rates are positive, the central bank keeps inflation at the target rate, 
and therefore an inflationary steady state (a) will be always realized. If nominal interest rates are 
stuck at ZLB, the instrument rule for the central bank’s manipulation of nominal interest rates is 
useless; thus, inflation depends mostly on households’ expected inflation. If households do not 
wish for the economy to collapse (or reach a non-optimal state), rθP  is indispensable and 
only the expected inflation that is consistent with state (a) or (b) can be generated.  
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2.4.2  The choice between inflationary and deflationary steady states 
The value of π0 is not given exogenously. It is determined by households in the process of them 
generating
Gθˆ and Pθˆ , and it varies depending on how and when households generate (or 
change)
Gθˆ after a shock on Pθˆ . How do households determine the value of π0? Households are 
rational and will not select a future path that results in collapse of the economy (or a 
non-optimal state) due to rθP  . Hence, households will select the value of π0 that is 
consistent with rθP  . In addition, as discussed in Section 2.3, households will basically 
always generate the expectation of θG = θP under a sufficiently independent central bank. 
Therefore, households select the value of π0 that satisfies both PG θθ
ˆˆ  and rθP  . The only 
states where π0 satisfies the both conditions are states (a) and (b); thus, households generate only 
Gθˆ that is consistent with either state (a) or (b). In other words, households have to choose the 
value of π0 from either
*π or r in the process of generating Gθˆ and Pθˆ . 
 Of course, the central bank prefers an inflationary steady state (a) and does not want a 
deflationary steady state (b) because π0 at state (b) is not the target rate π*. The central bank 
therefore will want to make households choose state (a). However, if nominal interest rates are 
stuck at ZLB, the central bank cannot force households to choose state (a) by manipulating 
nominal interest rates. It must therefore find other tools to force households to choose state (a). 
The question arises, however, of whether such a useful and effective tool exists.  
 
3  DIFFICULTY OF ENDING DEFLATION 
 
3.1  Forward-looking information  
To switch from state (b) to (a), households’ expectation of θG or θP must be changed because 
 rπ 0  is otherwise not changed. The value of π0 can be changed only in the process of 
generating
Gθˆ or Pθˆ . In addition, after a change in Gθˆ or Pθˆ , the condition PG θθ
ˆˆ  must be 
soon be restored because inflation/deflation otherwise accelerates. As discussed in Section 2.3, 
households will soon restore the condition
PG θθ
ˆˆ  because the central bank is sufficiently 
independent. Therefore, if the central bank can influence households’ expectation of θG or θP 
and make them change
Gθˆ or Pθˆ , it may be able to force households to switch from state (b) to 
(a).  
 Households will change
Gθˆ or Pθˆ if they obtain new important forward-looking 
information that is related to future θG or θP. Hence, the ability of the central bank to force a 
change in
Gθˆ or Pθˆ depends on whether it can deliver meaningful new forward-looking 
information that is related to
Gθˆ or Pθˆ and can make households believe this new information. 
 
3.2  Verbal intervention 
One way for the central bank to deliver forward-looking information is through verbal 
intervention. Forward-looking guidance on the future path of interest rates can be regarded as a 
kind of verbal intervention in a broad sense. If households change their expectations because of 
statements from the central bank, the central bank may successfully force the switch from state 
(b) to (a). Nevertheless, households are not so naïve as to literally believe all the statements of 
the central bank. The statements are therefore meaningless unless households believe that they 
contain true forward-looking information. If households suspect that the statements 
disseminated are deceptive or untrue, the verbal intervention is useless. To succeed, the central 
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bank must be perceived as sincere, honest, and capable. 
 Can even a sincere, honest, and capable central bank deliver a statement that will make 
households change their expectations and switch from state (b) to (a)? The central bank can ask, 
or even beg, households to change their expectations, but it is most likely difficult to persuade 
households that a deflationary steady state (b) is very harmful to them, because rθP  is 
satisfied at state (b) and the economy proceeds as “normally” as it does at state (a). Therefore, it 
will not be easy to make households change their expectations of θG or θP by verbal intervention 
alone. If the central bank delivers “false” or deceptive information about θG or θP, households 
may temporarily change their expectations, but eventually the justification and credibility of the 
central bank will be questioned and damaged. Verbal intervention therefore will not be 
sufficiently effective to force a switch from state (b) to (a). 
 Verbal intervention is also predicted to be ineffective by NKPC models for almost the 
same reasons. Unless a deceptive statement is delivered by the central banks, households will 
not feel the need to change their expectations.  
 
3.3  Quantitative easing (QE) 
In the Great Recession after the subprime mortgage crisis, some central banks that faced 
near-zero nominal interest rates adopted QE as a monetary policy to stimulate the economy by 
increasing the quantity of money in the economy. If QE is effective in changing households’ 
expectation of future θG or θP, it can be used as a monetary policy tool when nominal interest 
rates are stuck at ZLB.  
 QE is adopted on the basis of a strict interpretation of the quantity theory of money 
such that inflation/deflation is fundamentally governed by the growth rate of the money supply, 
which is exogenously given. However, the law of motion for inflation/deflation shown in 
Section 2 indicates that the quantity of money is irrelevant to inflation/deflation as shown in 
equation (2). The quantity of money will be determined endogenously after the rate of 
inflation/deflation is determined: that is, the direction of causality is from the rate of 
inflation/deflation to the quantity of money. Hence, a change in the quantity of money cannot 
directly affect inflation/deflation. Therefore, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to directly 
affect the expectation of θG or θP through the use of QE.  
 Nevertheless, if the use of QE delivers meaningful forward-looking information about 
future θG or θP, it could have a possible indirect effect on households’ expectations. By 
observing QE, households will perceive that the central bank wants them to change their 
expectations, but households determine their behavior on the basis of their own levels of 
optimality. If their optimality is not changed by QE, it is unlikely that households will change 
their expectations. Therefore, unless inflation/deflation and households’ optimality are directly 
affected by QE,
Gθˆ and Pθˆ will not be affected—even indirectly.   
 The quantity of money is not usually included in NKPC models (e.g., Ugai, 2007; 
Woodford, 2012), so it is doubtful, even in these models, whether QE would be able to directly 
affect households’ choices to switch from state (b) to (a). However, if QE influences 
households’ inflation/deflation expectations, it could be effective. The manner in which 
household’s inflation/deflation expectations are generated theoretically in NKPC models is 
unclear, however, when nominal interest rates are stuck at ZLB. Therefore, it is difficult to 
arrive at any clear theoretical conclusion about the effectiveness of QE on inflation/deflation 
channeled through households’ expectations of inflation/deflation.  
 
3.4  Renouncing independence 
The reason why only steady states (a) and (b) can be chosen is that the condition PG θθ
ˆˆ  must 
be satisfied: that is, the central bank must be sufficiently independent, as discussed in Section 2. 
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Even during deflation,
PG θθ
ˆˆ  will hold because of the inhibitory effect resulting from the 
central bank’s independence. Conversely, if the central bank is not independent, a deflationary 
steady state (b) will not be chosen because the inhibitory effect does not exist, and it is likely 
that θG > θP. Therefore, if the central bank renounces its independence, a switch from deflation 
to inflation may be possible. Adopting the measure of “helicopter money” as permanent and 
irreversible QE may be a kind of renouncement of independence. This, however, is an 
extraordinary and unconventional monetary policy.  
 Preferences are hard to control solely by oneself. As discussed in Appendix A, even 
though a government is fully rational and is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, it is still difficult 
for it to self-regulate its preferences. An independent central bank is therefore essential to 
control the government’s preference (i.e., θG), which it has difficulty controlling by itself. Hence, 
renouncing the central bank’s independence indicates that the government will behave on the 
basis of its own intrinsic preferences—particularly on Gθ —and θG > θP will prevail.  
 To have any lasting effect, the central bank would have to renounce its authority 
truthfully and indefinitely. At the least, households would need to firmly believe that the central 
bank has done so. There is another very serious problem with this solution. The renouncement 
will be accompanied by high or hyperinflation. If the bank’s independence is actually and 
indefinitely renounced, the deflationary steady state (b) will change, but not necessarily to the 
inflationary steady state (a) because the central bank is no longer independent. High or 
hyperinflation will be generated as a byproduct or side effect. Although the reversal of deflation 
may be successfully achieved, price stability will not. It seems unlikely, therefore, that either the 
central bank or households would support this measure.   
 A different conclusion may be drawn in NKPC models, but it is not theoretically clear 
how the independence of the central bank affects inflation/deflation in these models. In other 
words, the reason why the central bank and not the government should manipulate nominal 
interest rates according to a pre-determined instrument rule (e.g., a Taylor rule) is theoretically 
ambiguous. In NKPC models, it may be implicitly assumed that there is some difference in 
preferences between the government and the central bank, but this difference is not explicitly 
modeled. Therefore, it is unclear what would happen if the central bank renounced its 
independence in NKPC models. 
 
3.5  Raising nominal interest rates 
There is another extraordinary and unconventional monetary policy by which a central bank 
may be able to force a switch from state (b) to state (a): increasing nominal interest rates. 
Conventionally, when a central bank wants to raise inflation, it decreases nominal interest rates. 
By this measure, the government has to raise θG as the central bank desires because it cannot 
otherwise achieve optimality and, as a result, inflation increases. However, the same logic can 
be applied even if the central bank increases nominal interest rates until the government raises 
θG sufficiently. Hence, if nominal interest rates are increased, inflation may be also increased.   
 However, increasing nominal interest rates is very risky because θP may also be 
affected. Increasing nominal interest rates will generate a temporary recession, and households 
may feel increased levels of future uncertainty and raise
Pθˆ . If Pθˆ increases as much as θG 
increases, the effect of the higher θG will be cancelled out and inflation/deflation will not change. 
If that occurs, the act of raising nominal interest rates will have created a recession without 
solving the underlying problem of deflation. Because of this risk, this unconventional monetary 
policy almost certainly will not actually be used.  
 This measure may be considered to be effective in NKPC models. If nominal interest 
rates are stuck at ZLB, the instrument rule for the central bank’s manipulation of nominal 
interest rates is useless, and inflation depends primarily on households’ expected 
inflation/deflation. Usually, θP is exogenously given and constant in NKPC models; thus, when 
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nominal interest rates are raised by the central bank, the economy will collapse (or reach a 
non-optimal state) owing to the permanent condition rθP  unless the households’ inflation 
expectation is raised. If households strongly want to avoid an economic collapse, they will raise 
their expected inflation level so that this measure could possibly succeed. However, the 
conclusions will differ greatly depending on the assumptions of how inflation/deflation 
expectations are generated by households.  
 
3.6  Depreciating the exchange rate 
A sharp depreciation of the exchange rate raises prices of imported goods and services and may 
therefore temporarily cause deflation to change to inflation. If households change
Gθˆ or Pθˆ and 
consequently π0 because of this shock on the exchange rate, state (b) may be switched to state 
(a). Furthermore, if a government or central bank is able to deliberately depreciate the exchange 
rate sharply (i.e., if it can freely manipulate the exchange rate), it can use this as a tool to switch 
from state (b) to (a).  
 This strategy has two problems. First, it is not certain that a shock on the exchange rate 
will always affect the expectations of θG or θP, because the exchange rate is irrelevant to θG or 
θP directly according to the law of motion for inflation/deflation. If a change in the exchange 
rate possesses some forward-looking information,
Gθˆ or Pθˆ may be influenced indirectly by the 
change in the exchange rate, but that is not a theoretical certainty. Second, and more importantly, 
it is difficult for a government or central bank to freely manipulate the exchange rate. A change 
in exchange rates affects international trade and finance; thus, unilateral manipulation of 
exchange rates is problematic in the international community. At the least, this type of action 
will be fiercely condemned internationally. As a result, this strategy most likely will not be 
adoptable, at least not overtly.  
 Depreciating the exchange rate may be judged as effective in NKPC models (Svensson, 
2001; Coenen and Wieland, 2003, 2004). Depreciated exchange rates and the ensuing temporary 
inflation may change households’ inflation/deflation expectations. However, it is not clear why, 
or how, households change their expectations. In addition, the important problems related to the 
reaction of the international community remain the same. Therefore, in NKPC models, this 
strategy also seems unlikely to be used, at least not overtly.    
 
3.7  Waiting for a lucky event 
The expectations of θG and θP will of course be affected also by various exogenous shocks. 
There may be an exogenous shock that is large enough to make households switch from state (b) 
to (a). For example, if there is a large upward shock on the prices of imported goods (e.g., due to 
a hike in oil prices or a sharp exogenous depreciation in the exchange rate), households may 
think that a switch from state (b) to state (a) is better for them because it may be easier for them 
to adapt to the shock in inflationary steady state (a) than in deflationary steady state (b). Other 
examples include a large upward shock on
Gθˆ and a large downward shock on Pθˆ . There are 
many other possible exogenous shocks that may affect the households’ expectations and cause 
them to switch from state (b) to state (a). Nevertheless, these types of exogenous shock 
represent luck or randomness (given that exchange rates cannot be manipulated unilaterally by a 
government or central bank).   
 
3.8  Imposing taxes on money 
Several economists have proposed a tax on money to generate a negative rate of real interest 
(Fukao, 2005; Buiter, 2005). By using these taxes, nominal interest rates again become useful to 
achieve a target rate of inflation. This measure is therefore different from the previously 
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discussed ones that are intended to influence the households’ expectations. Because taxes are 
imposed by the government and not the central bank, the independence of the central bank is 
meaningless and the role of central bank becomes ambiguous. That said, once the deflation is 
reversed to inflation, the independent central bank again takes the initiative in controlling 
inflation.  
 This measure has the same problem as raising nominal interest rates. Imposing taxes 
on money may affect θP; in particular, it may increase θP. An increased θP leads to recession and 
the acceleration of deflation according to the law of motion for inflation/deflation. Imposing 
taxes on money therefore is very risky. If θP is not affected, this measure would be effective, but 
it seems likely that θP will be affected and any existing recession will be aggravated and 
deflation will accelerate. Because of these risks, this measure will almost certainly not actually 
be undertaken.  
 This measure may be considered to be effective in NKPC models. Because θP is 
usually exogenously given and constant in these models, inflation can be controlled by the 
monetary taxes without raising θP—that is, without the risk of aggravating an existing recession 
or accelerating deflation. Hence, this measure may be predicted to succeed with a high 
probability in examinations based NKPC models.   
 
3.9  Difficulty in switching from state (b) to (a) 
Examinations in this section have shown that it is difficult for a central bank to make 
households switch from a deflationary steady state (b) to an inflationary steady state (a). Verbal 
intervention and QE are basically ineffective. The extraordinary and unconventional monetary 
policy of renouncing central bank independence will have a large impact on the households’ 
expectations and reverse deflation, but it will be accompanied by a serious negative side 
effect—that is, high or hyper-inflation. Another extraordinary and unconventional monetary 
policy—raising nominal interest rates—has a high risk of introducing or worsening a recession 
without reversing the ongoing deflation. Imposing taxes on money shares the same risks. It 
seems that the most effective policy to realize a switch from state (b) to (a) is to wait for an 
exogenous event—that is, to get lucky.  
 This conclusion suggests that, when inflation shows a sign of changing to deflation in 
the near future, it is extremely important for the central bank to make households continue to 
choose inflationary steady state (a). It will be easier for a central bank to make them do so 
before deflation sets in, for example, by increasing the target rate of inflation and lowering 
nominal interest rates far more than usual (e.g., Williams, 2009). If a central bank can 
successfully make households continue to choose state (a), the deflationary state can be averted 
altogether. 
 Verbal intervention and use of QE were also considered to be basically ineffective in 
the NKPC models, but the effects of renouncing central bank independence and raising nominal 
interest rates are unclear. On the other hand, imposing taxes on money may be effective, but this 
measure has never actually been tried.  
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Once deflation takes root, it is not easy to reverse because of the ZLB. If nominal interest rates 
are stuck at the ZLB, the central bank loses power to manipulate nominal interest rates. The 
manipulation of expectations is instead regarded as an important alternative tool. In this paper, 
the feasibility and effectiveness of the manipulation of expectations were examined in the 
inflation/deflation model shown by Harashima (2004b, 2008, 2015a) as well as in conventional 
inflation models—particularly new-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) models.  
 There are only two steady states where both rθP  and PG θθ
ˆˆ  are satisfied: 
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inflationary steady state (a), at which *ππ 0 , and deflationary steady state (b), at which 
rπ 0 . Deflationary steady state (b) can be a steady state because the condition PG θθ
ˆˆ  can 
hold owing to the inhibitory effect of the independent central bank, even if nominal interest 
rates are stuck at ZLB. To switch from state (b) to (a), the households’ expectations need to be 
deliberately changed by the central bank. There are several possible ways to influence 
households’ expectations, but there is no decisive measure to certainly change their expectations. 
Verbal intervention and QE are not effective. Renouncing the independence of the central bank 
may be effective but has very negative side effects, and raising nominal interest rates is also 
very risky. It is uncertain whether depreciating the exchange rate is effective, and it is 
practically infeasible for international political reasons. Imposing taxes on money is another 
measure that is very risky and not guaranteed to work. The best way to switch from state (b) to 
(a) may simply be to wait for a fortuitous exogenous event (i.e., to be lucky). It may therefore be 
prudent for central banks to act drastically when inflation shows a sign of changing to deflation 
in the near future, for example, by increasing the target rate of inflation and lowering nominal 
interest rates far more than usual.  
 Even at deflationary steady state (b), however, the economy proceeds as normally as it 
does at inflationary steady state (a). Therefore, it may not be necessary for households to 
struggle to switch from deflationary steady state (b) to inflationary steady state (a), even though 
the central bank is very dissatisfied with deflationary steady state (b).  
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APPENDIX A 
 
A1  The law of motion for inflation/deflation 
A1.1  The government 
A1.1.1  The government budget constraint 
The government budget constraint is 
 
  
tttttt XGiBB 
  , 
 
where Bt is the nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, it is the 
nominal interest rate for government bonds, Gt is the nominal government expenditure, Xt is the 
nominal tax revenue, and 
t  is the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed 
to be lump sum, the government bonds are long term, and the returns on the bonds are realized 
only after the bonds are held during a unit period (e.g., a year). The government bonds are 
redeemed in a unit period, and the government successively refinances the bonds by issuing new 
ones at each time t. Let 
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, which is equivalent to 
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 Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds 
during a unit period, investors buy the bonds if  dsrπEi
t
t
sstt 

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1
 at time t, where 
ti  is 
the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t and rt is the real interest rate in markets at t. 
Hence, by arbitrage,  dsrπEi
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 and if rt is constant such that rrt   (i.e., if it is at 
steady state), then 
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The nominal interest rate rdsπEi
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between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the future 
increases not by  rπdt t   but by 
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t
t
st πdsπE 
1
 
and rπi tt  , but if πt is not constant, these equations do not necessarily hold. 
 Since bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds the 
government is holding at t have been issued between t - 1 and t. Hence, under perfect foresight, 
the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds at time t is the weighted sum of 
ti  
such that 
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where 
tsB ,  is the nominal value of bonds at time t that were issued at time s. If the weights 
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sufficiently smaller than unity, the differences among the weights are negligible and then 
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(see Harashima, 2008). The average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds, 
therefore, develops by rdsdυπi
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and it = πt + r do not necessarily hold.  
 
A1.1.2  An economically Leviathan government  
Under a proportional representation system, the government represents the median household 
whereas the representative household from an economic perspective represents the mean 
household.2 Because of this difference, they usually have different preferences. To account for 
this essential difference, a Leviathan government is assumed in the model.3 There are two 
extremely different views regarding government’s behavior in the literature on political 
economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980; Alesina and Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent 
government maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool 
used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a 
Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own policy objectives.4 For 
example, if a Leviathan government considers national security to be the most important 
political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if improving social welfare is the top 
political priority, spending on social welfare will increase dramatically, even though the 
increased expenditures may not necessarily increase the economic utility of the representative 
household. 
 Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long 
period? Yes, because a government is generally chosen by the median of households under a 
                                                          
2 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992). 
3 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
4 The government behavior assumed in the fiscal theory of the price level reflects an aspect of a Leviathan 
government. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in 
which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in advance of prices 
being determined in markets. 
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proportional representation system (e.g., Downs 1957), whereas the representative household 
usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean household. The economically 
representative household is not usually identical to the politically representative household, and 
a majority of people could support a Leviathan government even if they know that the 
government does not necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the economically 
representative household. In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an 
economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In 
addition, because the politically and economically representative households are different (the 
median and mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the current 
and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined government that goes 
on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government always represents the median 
representative household. 
 The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
expenditure, tax revenue, or related activities in the government’s political utility function (e.g., 
Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan government derives political 
utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the 
Leviathan government will be. But raising tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which 
increases the probability of being replaced by the opposing party that also nearly represents the 
median household. Thus, the economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary 
costs to obtain freedom of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will 
derive utility from expenditure and disutility from taxes. Expenditure and taxes in the political 
utility function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours are 
both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also 
control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of economically Leviathan 
government can be expressed as uG(gt, xt).5 In addition, it can be assumed on the basis of 
previously mentioned arguments that 0

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.6 An economically Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected 
sum of these utilities discounted by its time preference rate under the constraint of deficit 
financing. 
 
A1.1.3  The optimization problem 
The optimization problem of an economically Leviathan government is  
 
   dttθ,xguEMax GttG 

exp
0
 
                                                          
5 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case, the utility function of a government 
can be assumed to be  ttttG l,c,x,gu , where ct is real consumption and lt is the leisure hours of the representative 
household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect steady-state consumption 
and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be  ttG x,gu . 
6 Some may argue that it is more likely that 
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  at steady state. Thus, the results are not affected 
by which assumption is used.  
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subject to the budget constraint 
 
   ttttttt xgπibb   ,                      (A3) 
 
where uG is the constant relative risk aversion utility function of the government, θG is the 
government’s rate of time preference, and E is the expectation operator. All variables are 
expressed in per capita terms, and population is assumed to be constant. The government 
maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the economically 
representative household that is reflected in it in its budget constraint. 
 
A1.2  Households 
The economically representative household maximizes its expected economic utility. Sidrauski 
(1967)’s well-known money in the utility function model is used for the optimization problem. 
The representative household maximizes its expected utility 
 
   dttθm,cuE PttP 

exp
0
 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
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where uP and θP are the utility function and the time preference rate of the representative 
household, ct is real consumption, wt is real wage, σt is lump-sum real government transfers, mt 
is real money, at = kt + mt, and kt is real capital. It is assumed that rt = f’(kt), tw  
   ttt kfkkf  , 0'uP , 0"uP , 
 
0


t
ttP
m
m,cu
, and 
 
0
2
2



t
ttP
m
m,cu
, where  f  is the 
production function. Government expenditure (gt) is an exogenous variable for the 
representative household because it is an economically Leviathan government. It is also 
assumed that, although all households receive transfers from a government in equilibrium, when 
making decisions, each household takes the amount it receives as given, independent of its 
money holdings. Thus, the budget constraint means that the real output  tkf  at any time is 
demanded for the real consumption ct, the real investment tk
 , and the real government 
expenditure gt such that   tttt gkckf   . The representative household maximizes its 
expected economic utility considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in the budget 
constraint. In this discussion, a central bank is not assumed to be independent of the 
government; thus, the functions of the government and the central bank are not separated. This 
assumption can be relaxed, and the roles of the government and the central bank are explicitly 
separated in Section A2. 
 Note that the time preference rate of government (θG) is not necessarily identical to 
that of the representative household (θP) because the government and the representative 
household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean households, respectively). 
In addition, the preferences will differ because (1) even though people want to choose a 
government that has the same time preference rate as the representative household, the rates 
may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., Alesina and Cukierman 1990); and (2) current 
voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and, if current voters are aware of this possibility, 
they may vote more myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private 
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economic activities (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Hence, it is highly likely that the time 
preference rates of a government and the representative household are heterogeneous. It should 
be also noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, an 
economically Leviathan government behaves based only on its own time preference rate, 
without hesitation. 
 
A1.3  The simultaneous optimization 
First, I examine the optimization problem of the representative household. Let Hamiltonian HP 
be       ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπcσwarλtθm,cuH  exp , where λP,t is a costate 
variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. The optimality conditions for 
the representative household are;  
 
 
  tP,P
t
ttP λtθ
c
m,cu



exp  ,                       (A4) 
 
 
   tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu



exp  ,                    (A5) 
 
ttP,tP, rλλ 
  ,                              (A6) 
 
    ttttttttt gmrπcσwraa   ,                (A7) 
 
0lim 

ttP,
t
aλ  .                            (A8) 
 
By conditions (A4) and (A5), 
   
tt
t
ttP
t
ttP rπ
m
m,cu
c
m,cu











1
, and by conditions (A4) and 
(A6),  
 
   
tP
t
t
t
ttP
t
ttP
t rθ
c
c
c
m,cu
c
m,cu
c 













2
2
1
 .                 (A9) 
 
Hence, 
 
θP = rt = r                             (A10) 
 
at steady state such that 0tc  and 0tk
 . 
 Next, I examine the optimization problem of the economically Leviathan government. 
Let Hamiltonian HG be       tttttttG,GttGG xgπibλtθx,guH  exp , where λG,t is a 
costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government are;  
 
 
  tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu



exp  ,                    (A11) 
 
 
  tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu



exp  ,                    (A12) 
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 tttG,tG, πiλλ   ,                         (A13) 
 
  ttttttt xgπibb   ,                    (A14) 
 
0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  .                          (A15) 
 
Combining conditions (A11), (A12), and (A13) and equation (A2) yields the following 
equations: 
 
   
t
t
t
s
s
υtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t πdsdυπrπiθ
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g
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x,gu
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
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





  
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
     (A16) 
 
and  
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t
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t
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t πdsdυπrπiθ
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x
x
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x
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
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 .    (A17) 
 
Here, 
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x
x
x,gu
x
x,gu
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 at 
steady state such that 0tg  and 0tx ; thus, 
 
t
t
t
s
s
υtG πdsdυπrθ   

1
1
 .                  (A18) 
 
Hence, by equation (A10), 
 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
                    (A19) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
 .7   
 Equation (A19) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by the 
economically Leviathan government and the representative household. If the rates of time 
preference are heterogeneous between them, then 
 
  
t
t
t
s
s
υt πdsdυπri   

1
1
 . 
 
This result might seem surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that it = πt + r. 
However, this is a simple misunderstanding because πt indicates the instantaneous rate of 
                                                          
7 If and only if 
t
ttt
G
b
xg
θ


 at steady state, then the transversality condition (A1-15) 0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  holds. 
The proof is shown in Harashima (2008). 
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inflation at a point such that 
t
t
t
P
P
π

 , whereas dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
 roughly indicates the 
average inflation rate in a period. Equation (A19) indicates that πt develops according to the 
integral equation 
PG
t
t
s
s
υt θθdsdυππ   

1
1
. If πt is constant, the equations rπi tt   and 
t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 are true. However, if πt is not constant, the equations do not necessarily 
hold. Equation (A19) indicates that the equations rπi tt   and t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 
hold only in the case where θG = θP (i.e., a homogeneous rate of time preference). It has been 
previously thought that a homogeneous rate of time preference naturally prevails; thus, the 
equation it = πt + r has not been questioned. As argued previously, however, a homogeneous 
rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. 
 
A1.4  The law of motion for trend inflation 
Equation (A19) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government 
and the representative household reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of time 
preference. If πt is constant, the equation dsdυππ
t
t
s
s
υt  


1
1
 holds; conversely, if tπ  
dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
, then πt is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of inflation, 
therefore, equation (A19) cannot hold in an economy in which 
PG θθ  . In other words, it is not 
until 
PG θθ   that inflation can accelerate or decelerate. Heterogeneous time preferences 
(
PG θθ  ) bend the path of inflation and enables inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The 
difference of time preference rates (
PG θθ  ) at each time needs to be transformed to the 
accelerated or decelerated inflation rate πt at each time.  
     Equation (A19) implies that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly in the case in 
which 
PG θθ  . For a sufficiently small period dt, dttπ 1  is determined with πs  11  tst  
that satisfies 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
, so as to hold the equation dsdυπ
dtt
t
s
s
υ 
 1
 
tdtt
dtt
t
s
s
υ ππdsdυπ  



 
1
1
1
. A solution of the integral equation (A19) for given θG and 
θP is 
 
  20 6 tθθππ PGt   .                        (A20) 
 
Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies equation (A19) for t0  is expressed as 
 
      tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60   , 
 
where zt is a time dependent variable. The stream of zt is various depending on the boundary 
condition, i.e., the past and present inflation during 01  t  and the path of inflation during 
10  t  that is set to make π0 satisfy equation (A19). However, zt has the following important 
property. If πt satisfies equation (A19) for t0 , and  tπ  for 11  t , then  
 
  2lim 

t
t
z  . 
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Proof is shown in Harashima (2008). Any inflation path that satisfies equation (A19) for t0  
therefore asymptotically approaches the path of equation (A20). The mechanism behind the law 
of motion for inflation (equation [A20]) is examined more in detail in Harashima (2008). 
 
A2  The central bank 
A central bank manipulates the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor-type 
instrument rule in the model; 
 
  tx*tπt xγππγγi   ,                     (A21) 
 
where π* is the target rate of inflation and γ , γπ, and γx are constant coefficients. rπγ
*   
as is usually assumed.  
 In Section A1, central banks are not explicitly considered because they are not 
assumed to be independent of governments. However, in actuality, central banks are 
independent organizations in most countries even though some of them are not sufficiently 
independent. Furthermore, in the conventional inflation model, it is the central banks that 
control inflation and governments have no role in controlling inflation. Conventional inflation 
models show that the rate of inflation basically converges at the target rate of inflation set by a 
central bank. The target rate of inflation therefore is the key exogenous variable that determines 
the path of inflation in these models.  
     Both the government and the central bank can probably affect the development of 
inflation, but they would do so in different manners, as equation (A20) and conventional 
inflation models indicate. However, the objectives of the government and the central bank may 
not be the same. For example, if trend inflation is added to conventional models by replacing 
their aggregate supply equations with equation (A20), inflation cannot necessarily converge at 
the target rate of inflation because another key exogenous variable (θG) is included in the 
models. A government makes inflation develop consistently with the equation (A20), which 
implies that inflation will not necessarily converge at the target rate of inflation. Conversely, a 
central bank makes inflation converge at the target rate of inflation, which implies that inflation 
will not necessarily develop consistently with equation (A20). That is, unless either θG is 
adjusted to be consistent with the target rate of inflation or the target rate of inflation is adjusted 
to be consistent with θG, the path of inflation cannot necessarily be determined. Either θG or the 
target rate of inflation need be an endogenous variable. If a central bank dominates, the target 
rate of inflation remains as the key exogenous variable and θG should then be an endogenous 
variable. The reverse is also true.  
 A central bank will be regarded as truly independent if θG is forced to be adjusted to 
the one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation set by the central bank. For example, 
suppose that 
PG θθ   and a truly independent central bank manipulates the nominal interest 
rate according to the Taylor-type instrument rule (equation [A21]). Here, 
 
tG
t
t
s
s
υt πθrdsdυπi   

1
1
                    (A22) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
  by equations (A2), (A10), 
and (A19). If the accelerating inflation rate is higher than the target rate of inflation, the central 
bank can raise the nominal interest rate from 
tGt πθi   (equation [A22]) to 
 
ψπθi tGt   
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by positive ψ by intervening in financial markets to lower the accelerating rate of inflation. In 
this case, the central bank keeps the initial target rate of inflation because it is truly independent. 
The government thus faces a rate of increase of real obligation that is higher than θG by the extra 
rate ψ.8 If the government lowers θG so that θG < θP and inflation stops accelerating, the central 
bank will accordingly reduce the extra rate ψ. If, however, the government does not 
accommodate θG to the target rate of inflation, the extra rate ψ will increase as time passes 
because of the gap between the accelerating inflation rate and the target rate of inflation widens 
by equation (A20) and γx in Taylor-type instrument rules is usually larger than unity, say 1.5. 
Because of the extra rate ψ, the government has no other way to achieve optimization unless it 
lowers θG to one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation. Once the government 
recognizes that the central bank is firmly determined to be independent and it is in vain to try to 
intervene in the central bank’s decision makings, the government would not dare to attempt to 
raise θG again anymore. 
 Equation (A20) implies that a government allows inflation to accelerate because it acts 
to maximize its expected utility based only on its own preferences. A government is hardly the 
only entity that cannot easily control its own preferences even when these preferences may 
result in unfavorable consequences. It may not even be possible to manipulate one’s own 
preferences at will. Thus, even though a government is fully rational and is not weak, foolish, or 
untruthful, it is difficult for it to self-regulate its preferences. Hence, an independent neutral 
organization is needed to help control θG. Delegating the authority to set and keep the target rate 
of inflation to an independent central bank is a way to control θG. The delegated independent 
central bank will control θG because it is not the central bank’s preference to stabilize the price 
level—it is simply a duty delegated to it. An independent central bank is not the only possible 
choice. For example, pegging the local currency with a foreign currency can be seen as a kind of 
delegation to an independent neutral organization. In addition, the gold standard that prevailed 
before World War II can be also seen as a type of such delegation. 
 Note also that the delegation may not be viewed as bad from the Leviathan 
government’s point of view because only its rate of time preference is changed, and the 
government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of the argument that central 
banks should be independent (e.g., Blinder 1998) is that, since the time-inconsistency problem 
argued in Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and Gordon (1983) is more acute with fiscal 
policy, why is it not also necessary to delegate fiscal policies? An economically Leviathan 
government, however, will never allow fiscal policies to be delegated to an independent neutral 
organization because the Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political 
objectives, which in a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. The median 
household that backs the Leviathan government, but at the same time dislikes high inflation, 
will therefore support the delegation of authority but only if it concerns monetary policy. The 
independent central bank will then be given the authority to control θG and oblige the 
government to change θG in order to meet the target rate of inflation. 
 Without such a delegation of authority, it is likely that generally θG > θP because θG 
represents the median household whereas θP represents the mean household. Empirical studies 
indicate that the rate of time preference negatively correlates with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance 1991), and the permanent income of the median household is usually lower than that 
of the mean household. If generally θG > θP, that suggests that inflation will tend to accelerate 
unless a central bank is independent. The independence of the central bank is therefore very 
important in keeping the path of inflation stable. 
     Note also that the forced adjustments of θG by an independent central bank are exogenous 
                                                          
8 The extra rate ψ affects not only the behavior of government but also that of the representative household, in which 
the conventional inflation theory is particularly interested. In this sense, the central bank’s instrument rule that 
concerns and simultaneously affects both behaviors of the government and the representative household is 
particularly important for price stability. 
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shocks to both the government and the representative household because they are planned solely 
by the central bank. When a shock on the expected θG is given, the government and the 
representative household must recalculate their optimal paths including the path of inflation by 
resetting θG, πt, and φ.     
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APPENDIX B 
 
B1  Preference vs. rationality 
The law of motion for inflation/deflation discussed in Section 2.1 indicates that, if the 
government behaves on the basis of its intrinsic RTP, inflation will accelerate. On the other 
hand, if people strongly dislike inflation acceleration, a government has to behave so as to not 
accelerate inflation; however, this conflicts with its own intrinsic preference.  
 
B1.1  The conflict between preference and rationality 
Behaving on the basis of its own intrinsic preferences does not mean that a government acts in a 
stupid, foolish, or irrational manner; rather, it behaves quite normally by naturally adhering to 
its intrinsic preferences. A fundamental question arises, however: Even if the government is 
acting quite normally, is this behavior rational? In economics, rationality usually means that, 
given the available information, optimal decisions are made to achieve an objective, and rational 
behavior is generally assumed. However, can rational behavior still prevail when a government 
cannot optimize its behavior to achieve its objective? This special situation emerges if the 
central bank is perfectly independent and is firmly determined to stabilize inflation and if, at the 
same time, the intrinsic time preference rate of government is unchangeable. In this situation, 
the economy will become severely destabilized because it is impossible to satisfy equation (1). 
Therefore, the government cannot achieve its objective (i.e., cannot maximize its expected 
utility) and can behave only irrationally. Conversely, if the government wants to optimize its 
objective and behave rationally, it must change its time preference. Clearly, trade-offs between 
rationality and time preference exist in some situations, and either rationality or time preference 
must be endogenized.  
 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that people will not optimize their behavior to meet 
their objectives (i.e., maximize utility) if they have complete knowledge of the optimal path. 
Hence, rationality should prevail over preferences, and time preference will be endogenized 
when a clash between rationality and time preference occurs. If time preference is endogenized, 
rational decisions become possible. Even though rationality should eventually prevail over 
preferences, governments will not easily change their own preferences. They will resist 
endogenizing them and search for options to escape from doing so—it is this stubborn nature 
that drives a government to deviate from the path specified by its central bank. Even though 
unfavorable consequences are expected if no change is made, it can be very difficult to change 
one’s own preferences alone. Controlling preferences therefore usually requires the help of 
other people or institutions; this is one of the reasons why independent central banks were 
established to stabilize inflation.  
 If a central bank is not sufficiently independent, the government must change its RTP 
on its own so as to not accelerate inflation. A government must then rein in its preferences on its 
own. The RTP of government, therefore, is determined through the struggle between preference 
and rationality inside the government. If rationality prevails, inflation does not accelerate, but if 
preference prevails, inflation will accelerate.   
 
B1.2  Two environments 
Models are simplified representations of reality. Therefore, models can be classified by how far 
the chosen model simplifies reality. In particular, models are classified by whether they are 
based on the assumption that all agents are homogeneous (i.e., a homogeneous environment) or 
on the assumption that agents are heterogeneous (i.e., a heterogeneous environment).    
 In models based on a homogeneous environment, it is usually assumed that rationality 
always prevails over preference, because it has generally been regarded that there is no conflict 
between preference and rationality in a homogeneous environment. In general, the dominance of 
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rationality in a homogeneous environment has been undoubted (i.e., the rational expectation 
hypothesis has been accepted).  
 On the other hand, dominance of rationality in a heterogeneous environment is not 
necessarily guaranteed because, unlike in a homogeneous environment, serious contradictions 
between preference and rationality arise in a heterogeneous environment. For example, Becker 
(1980) showed that, if the RTPs of households are heterogeneous, the most patient household 
will eventually own all the capital in an economy and the other households cannot achieve 
optimality. That is, all households except the most patient household cannot behave rationally in 
the sense that rational households behave in such a way to achieve optimality, if they adhere to 
their own intrinsic RTPs. Harashima (2004b, 2008, 2015a) showed another case. If a 
government adheres to its own intrinsic RTP that is higher than the RTP of the representative 
household, inflation accelerates. If people dislike inflation acceleration and thereby the 
government has to behave under the condition that it does not accelerate inflation, there is no 
path that satisfies all optimality conditions for the government as long as it adheres to its own 
intrinsic RTP. In a heterogeneous environment, therefore, conflicts between preference and 
rationality can occur. 
 
B1.3  Necessary intelligence 
The struggle between preference and rationality is dealt with in the human brain. To resolve 
conflicts, humans need particular powers or functions—that is, different types of intelligence.  
 
B1.3.1  Sustainability in a union or society 
Properly dealing with the struggle between preference and rationality is essential for humans 
because humans do not live alone—they are social and live in groups. However, the struggle has 
the potential to destroy a society. In a heterogeneous environment, if preference prevails over 
rationality, there is no guarantee that a political union or society is sustainable because some 
members of society cannot achieve optimality. In theory, this problem does not exist in a 
homogeneous environment, because the conflict basically does not exist and competitive 
equilibria are optimal for all people. On the other hand, in a heterogeneous environment, 
competitive equilibria are not necessarily optimal for all people because people have 
heterogeneous preferences, as discussed in Section B1.2. Many of the people who cannot 
achieve optimality will strongly oppose the government or other people, and it is likely that the 
political union or society will collapse, possibly violently.  
 A political union or society is formed and maintained because it provides benefits to 
its members. Behaviors that support a union or society are important for humans to survive. The 
type of potential vulnerability in heterogeneous environments that is discussed above indicates 
that various types of intelligence are essential to properly manage the struggle between 
preference and rationality.  
 
B1.3.1.1  Calculations 
In a heterogeneous environment, relationships among people are far more complicated than in a 
homogeneous environment because people do not all behave in the same way in a 
heterogeneous environment. Humans must possess the intelligence to cope with these 
complicated relationships. They need to be able to calculate the outcomes of various activities in 
a heterogeneous group of people, evaluate the outcomes, and select the best action to take 
among many options in their brains.  
 The number of calculations required to reach an optimal solution is far larger in a 
heterogeneous environment than in a homogeneous one because the number of types of people 
that must be considered and the number of interconnections among heterogeneous people are far 
greater in a heterogeneous environment. If each person’s brain can cope with this extremely 
large number of calculations, people can behave rationally (i.e., always take the best actions that 
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are calculated to be optimal, that is, the ones that are consistent with the model) even in a 
heterogeneous environment. If this does not occur, rationality may not prevail over preference. 
 
B1.3.1.2  Evaluation 
After a variety of potential outcomes are calculated, many options are evaluated on the basis of 
the results of calculations to select the optimal option. Therefore, people must have the 
intelligence to evaluate options. The optimal future path is more complicated in a heterogeneous 
environment than in a homogeneous environment, because households act differently. The 
intelligence needed for evaluation allows people to accurately identify the optimal future path 
by comparing and evaluating various aspects of many different complicated paths.  
 
B1.3.1.3  Self-control  
In addition, another type of intelligence is required—that which allows people to align their 
preferences so as to follow the optimal option. Even if an optimal option is appropriately 
calculated and evaluated, the optimal option cannot be implemented if people’s preferences are 
not properly controlled. That is, people must exercise self-control. This type of intelligence 
applies to other activities as well—for example, when a person is on a diet. Children often have 
difficulty exercising self-control because this type of intelligence is not yet fully developed in 
childhood. In addition, it seems highly likely that it is also not necessarily sufficiently 
developed in many adults, and even adults will often lose the battle when forced to choose an 
option that is against their own preferences.  
 
B1.3.2  Intelligence needed when the three types of subordinate intelligence are 
deficient 
It remains unclear whether humans are sufficiently equipped with the necessary types of 
intelligence to deal with the calculation, evaluation, and self-control aspects of decision-making 
in a heterogeneous environment. For example, the capacity of a human’s brain may be 
insufficient to process the extremely large number of calculations necessary in a heterogeneous 
environment. If this first type of intelligence is insufficient, it will be even more difficult to 
evaluate which option is appropriate to prevent disrupting the political union or society. 
Furthermore, even if the intelligence needed for calculations is sufficient, actions taken will not 
be optimal if the evaluation process is biased or poor.    
 If any part of the three subordinate intelligences is deficient, however, humans still 
have alternative methods to employ. For example, they can use approximations. The number of 
calculations needed will be significantly reduced if an appropriate approximation method is 
used. The intelligence needed for approximation is likely basically different from the three types 
of subordinate intelligence, although there may be partial overlap between them. For appropriate 
approximations, the concept of “fluid intelligence” will be particularly important. 
 
B1.3.3  Fluid intelligence 
In psychology and psychometrics, many types of intelligence have been considered, including 
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, short-term memory, long-term storage and retrieval, 
reading and writing ability, and visual processing. Among these, the importance of the 
difference between fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence has been particularly 
emphasized. According to Cattell (1963, 1971), fluid intelligence is the ability to solve novel 
problems by thinking logically without only depending on knowledge previously acquired. This 
type of intelligence signifies the ability to deal with new situations without relying on 
knowledge gained at school or through experience. With the help of fluid intelligence, people 
can flexibly adapt their thinking to new kinds of problems or situations. By contrast, crystallized 
intelligence is the capacity to acquire and use previously obtained knowledge. 
 Fluid intelligence is essential when people make approximate calculations and need to 
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judge which approximation is the best among many choices. These judgments are very difficult 
because we do not know the true values. Therefore, judgments must be made after 
comprehensive consideration of various choices. Such judgments represent “something new” in 
the sense that they will not necessarily be judged as best in future periods and under different 
circumstances. People need to make new judgments in any future period. That is, we must solve 
an “unknown problem” on each occasion to make the best approximation. Thus, these 
judgments are innovations that are made by using a person’s fluid intelligence. Fluid 
intelligence is therefore essential in a heterogeneous environment.  
 These types of judgments are similar to decisions made in politics. Political conditions 
change from moment to moment. Yesterday’s optimal political decision may be a non-optimal 
political decision today. Furthermore, nobody knows for certain whether today’s political 
decision is truly optimal. Historians examine whether past political decisions were optimal, but 
there are many political decisions over which even historians cannot reach consensus about their 
optimality.  
  
B1.4  The degree of rationality in a heterogeneous environment 
B1.4.1  The item response theory 
Fluid intelligence can be modeled on the basis of the item response theory, which is used widely 
in psychometric studies (e.g., Lord and Novick, 1968; van der Linden and Hambleton, 1997). In 
particular, the item response function is used to describe the relationship between abilities and 
item responses. 
 A typical item response function is  
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where p~  is the probability of a correct response (e.g., answer) to an item (e.g., test or question), 
μ~ (∞ > μ~ > -∞) is a parameter that indicates an individual’s ability, a~ (> 0) is a parameter that 
characterizes the slope of the function, b
~
(∞ ≥ b
~
≥ -∞) is a parameter that represents the 
difficulty of an item, and c~  (1 ≥ c~ ≥ 0) is a parameter that indicates the probability that an item 
can be answered correctly by chance.  
 
B1.4.2  The probability of dominance of rationality 
How frequently rationality prevails over preference can be modeled with an item response 
function. Let FI be the degree of fluid intelligence in a person. Larger values of FI indicate 
stronger fluid intelligence in the sense that a person more correctly grasps (approximates) a 
situation by using fluid intelligence. Let also pHE be the probability that rationality prevails over 
preference in a heterogeneous environment. On the basis of the item response theory, pHE can be 
modeled as a function of FI such that  
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where aˆ (> 0) is a parameter that characterizes the slope of the function, bˆ (∞ ≥ bˆ ≥ -∞) is a 
parameter that represents the difficulty and complexity of a situation, and cˆ  (1 ≥ cˆ ≥ 0) is a 
parameter that indicates the probability that rationality prevails over preference by exogenous 
factors. If FI is sufficiently large, rationality almost always prevails over preference in a 
heterogeneous environment, but if it is very small, preference almost always prevails over 
rationality.  
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 An important implication of equation (B1) is that the rational expectation hypothesis is 
not necessarily acceptable in a heterogeneous environment. If FI is small (i.e., fluid intelligence 
is weak), preference will often prevail over rationality and thus the rational expectation 
hypothesis cannot be unconditionally accepted.  
 
B1.5  Fluid intelligence of government 
According to the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs, 1957), a government behaves just as the 
median voter prefers in a one-person one-vote democratic political system. This theorem 
suggests that the fluid intelligence of government is equal to that of the median voter. On the 
other hand, the top-level positions in government are usually occupied by the best and brightest 
in a country, and they will almost certainly have stronger fluid intelligence than the median 
voter. However, does that mean these officials will make decisions that are different from those 
of the median voter? If they do so, they will be forced to step down in the next election 
according to the median voter theorem. Only politicians who make the same decisions as the 
median voter will be able to occupy top-level positions. Hence, it is likely that the fluid 
intelligence of government is practically equal to that of the median voter when dealing with 
issues in which preference and rationality conflict.  
 
B1.6  The nature of cˆ  
The value of cˆ  is affected by exogenous factors. For example, if the central bank is 
sufficiently independent and capable, cˆ  becomes unity—that is, the central bank makes 
rationality always prevail over preference with regard to the RTP of government. The 
government is always forced to change its RTP as the central bank orders. It is likely that many 
institutions or mechanisms work to raise the value of cˆ . For example, constitutions, laws, 
treaties, and many government and international organizations will raise the value of cˆ  by 
urging governments to maintain rationality. Such institutions and mechanisms have probably 
been adopted in many societies, because experience has taught us that they help ensure that 
rationality prevails over preference in a heterogeneous environment. As new institutions or 
mechanisms were invented and adopted, the probability that rationality prevails over preference 
may have gradually increased (by increasing the value of cˆ ) through time. Therefore, it is 
likely that, as civilization has progressed, cˆ  has increased, and rationality more frequently 
prevails over preference in a heterogeneous environment.  
 
B2  A model of government RTP 
B2.1  Determinants of θG  
The value of θG will usually be equal to the RTP of the median voter, as discussed in Section 
B1.5. However, in some cases, other elements will also affect the value of θG. The determinants 
of θG will be basically classified into the following two elements.  
 
B2.1.1  Preference element  
In this paper, I call the determinant that is equal to that of the median voter’s RTP the 
“preference element.” This element usually determines the main body of θG. Let θG,pre be the 
preference element component of θG, and θP,med be the intrinsic RTP of the median voter. As 
discussed in Section B1.5, the intrinsic θG,pre is basically equal to the intrinsic θP,med in a 
one-person one-vote democratic political system. Therefore, in the following sections, I assume 
that θG,pre = θP,med.  
 
B2.1.2  Political element 
The determinant that is peculiar to the government’s RTP is the “political element.” Let θG,pol be 
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the political element component of θG. If a political system is maintained and stable forever, the 
political element will be nil, and θG will be determined only by the preference element. 
However, if a political system is unstable, the political element component is not zero, and it 
increases as the political system becomes more unstable. Although rare, it is possible for a 
political system to collapse. There are many historical examples of the collapse of a political 
system. These have been often observed, for example, after a defeat in a large-scale war or after 
a revolution. The political element is of great significance when a political system is on the 
brink of collapse. Faced with an impending collapse of the system, the incumbent government 
will do anything possible to survive the crisis. From the government’s perspective, the far future 
is meaningless—survival is the primary objective. It imposes taxes and increases expenditures 
so as to avoid immediate collapse. As a result, its actions become increasingly myopic and 
impatient in the sense that it does not concern itself with future economic conditions. This 
behavior indicates an increase in θG,pol.   
 For most democratic countries, the probability of an imminent collapse of the political 
system will be negligible, and we may assume that θG,pol is zero in those countries, but the 
political element is very important in politically unstable countries. 
 
B2.2  The model 
Section B1 indicates that pHE needs to be expected to generate an expected θG,pre. Let pHE,G be 
the pHE of the government and pHE,P be the pHE of the median voter. Because basically θG,pre = 
θP,med as discussed in Section B2.1, pHE,G = pHE,P generally, and thereby it is reasonable to 
assume that pHE,G = pHE,P. Therefore, in a one-person one-vote political system,  
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where FIP,med is the FI of the median voter. Equation (B2) indicates that the smaller FIP,med is, 
the smaller pHE,G is and the higher the probability of inflation acceleration. 
 Suppose that the central bank is not independent of the government. Thereby, the 
government has to control its RTP by itself, that is, without being forced to so by the central 
bank. (The case for an independent central bank is discussed in Section B2.4.) Suppose also for 
simplicity that the probability that a political system is on the brink of collapse is pinst and θG,pol 
takes a unique positive value, and the probability of a stable political system is then 1– pinst and 
θG,pol = 0. The model of the government’s RTP that is used to generate the expected RTP of 
government is therefore  
 
       G , p r eG , p o li n s tGHEPGHEG θθppθpθ  ,, 1  
        G , p r eG , p o li n s tbFIaPbFIa θθp
e
c
cθ
e
c
c
medPmedP























 ˆˆˆˆ ,, 1
ˆ1
ˆ1
1
ˆ1
ˆ  .   (B3) 
 
Equation (B3) indicates that the RTP of government is equal to θP when rationality prevails over 
preference with the probability pHE,G. When preference prevails over rationality with the 
probability 1 – pHE,G, the RTP of government is equal to the intrinsic RTP of government. The 
intrinsic RTP of government consists of θG,pol with the probability pinst and θG,pre. 
 Because θG,pre = θP,med (as assumed in Section B2.1.1), then by equation (B3),  
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 In most democratic countries, the probability of the occurrence of extreme political 
instability is very low. For those countries, therefore, the model is reduced to a more simple 
form by assuming 
instp = 0 such that 
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 Note that if the people and the government have sufficiently strong fluid intelligences, 
an independent central bank may not be necessary. However, pHE will not be unity even in a 
country whose people have the highest pHE in the world. Therefore, it is possible for θG > θP in 
some period in any country; thus, an independent central bank is still important for all countries.  
 
B2.3  Generating an expected θG by using heuristics 
B2.3.1  Difficulty in expecting θG  
Specifying the functional form of the structural model of θG is only half of the problem of 
generating an expected θG. Although we have the functional form of the model, as shown in 
equation (B5), we still cannot generate an expected θG unless we specify appropriate values of 
the parameters aˆ , bˆ  and cˆ . Furthermore, to generate the expected θG, we must also know 
the expected values of θP, θP,med, and FIP,med.   
 We may roughly specify the parameter values of aˆ , bˆ  and cˆ  through the results 
of some type of social experiment, or we may use the estimates derived from other kinds of 
model concerning fluid intelligence. By substituting these values for the parameter values in the 
structural model of θG, the model could be calibrated. However, expectations based on these 
estimates will most likely be rather inaccurate and therefore problematic in terms of 
decision-making on future actions.   
 A far more serious problem is obtaining the expected future values of θP, θP,med, and 
FIP,med. It is not certain whether the values of θP and θP,med are constant across time; in fact, 
many researchers have posited that it is much more likely that they are temporally variable (e.g., 
Uzawa, 1968; Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Parkin, 1988; Obstfeld, 1990; 
Becker and Mulligan, 1997). Therefore, there is no guarantee that the future values of θP and 
θP,med will equal past ones, so the past values cannot be used as substitutes for the expected 
future values of θP and θP,med. Hence, to generate the expected future values of θP and θP,med, we 
have to calculate them on the basis of structural models of θP and θP,med. Even if we knew the 
functional forms of these structural models, we would still need to determine the parameter 
values for the models. To determine them, however, we would need to obtain a sufficiently 
large amount of data on the past values of θP and θP,med—that is, the intrinsic RTPs of the 
representative household and the median voter. Although a household knows its own RTP, it 
cannot directly observe θP and θP,med in the same way that it can obtain data on aggregate 
consumption, investment, production, inflation, trade, and other indicators at relatively low cost. 
Without data on the past values of θP and θP,med, we cannot estimate the parameter values. 
Therefore, we cannot generate the expected future values of θP and θP,med on the basis of their 
structural models. 
 Past data on the real interest rate may be used as a substitute for past θP because θP is 
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basically equal to the real interest rate at steady state (Fisher, 1930). However, during a 
transition period after θP changes, θP is not equal to the rate of real interest. Therefore, unless θP 
is constant across time, this substitution does not seem to be sufficiently useful. In addition, if 
θP,med is constant across time, we may approximate the value of θP,med on the basis of historical 
economic and political (election) data. However, as stated in the previous paragraph, it is not 
known whether θP and θP,med are constant across time.  
 Note that, if we assume that RTP is identical for all households, an expected θP and 
θP,med are no longer necessary because the RTP of any household is equal to both θP and θP,med. 
This assumption is very problematic, however, because it is not merely expedient for the sake of 
simplicity. It is also a critical requirement to eliminate the need for generating an expected θP 
and θP,med. Therefore, any rationale for assuming identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it 
should be demonstrated that identical RTPs do exist and are universally observed. In any case, 
RTP is unquestionably not identical among households. Therefore, households must generate 
the expected values of θP and θP,med. 
 
B2.3.2  Expectations based on beliefs 
Faced with the difficulty of generating expected values of θP and θP,med and knowing the 
parameter values in the model of θG, households may have to use the concept of bounded 
rationality to make decisions. One of a few alternatives available for a household to use is its 
“beliefs” in θP and θP,med as well as in aˆ , bˆ , cˆ , and FIP,med. The use of beliefs does not mean 
that households deviate from rationality; rather, it is the most rational option in an environment 
where insufficient information is available.  
 Belief is merely that, however—belief. There is no guarantee that the value a 
household believes to be true is actually the correct value. Therefore, it may often change, but it 
will be changed only if forward-looking information becomes available. In some cases, a 
household will change its belief when new data are obtained, but in other cases the household 
will not, depending on how it interprets the new information. This is particularly true when the 
household believes that it has extracted forward-looking information about θP and θP,med from 
the newly obtained data.  
 
B2.3.3  Heuristics 
When households interpret the information extracted from new data, they may use heuristic 
methods such as a simplified linear reduced form model of θG. Studies of the use of heuristics 
and bounded rationality in this context would be useful for better understanding the 
interpretation mechanism. Heuristic methods will be implemented through the use of fluid 
intelligence. Hence, the value of FIP,med will also be important in improving the accuracy of 
expectations generated on the basis of heuristics.  
 There may be many possible simplified linear reduced form models of θG that could be 
used as heuristic methods, although most of them may be ad hoc. Even though such reduced 
form models are far less credible than a structural model, they may be utilized as a heuristic 
method of interpretation. Although simplified linear reduced form models may often result in 
misleading conclusions, they may sometimes provide useful information.  
 
B2.4  Independent central bank 
B2.4.1  Generating expected θG – θP through the actions of a central bank 
A heuristic way of generating an expected θG is to use information about θG – θP. The model of 
inflation acceleration presented in Section 2 indicates that inflation acceleration and 
deceleration are governed by the value of θG – θP. Therefore, what people really need to know is 
not the expected θG but the expected θG – θP. If the central bank is sufficiently independent, θG 
is determined by the central bank. In this case, people do not need to know the RTP of the 
government, but rather the responses of the central bank to θG – θP. If an easy method exists to 
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know the response of the central bank to θG – θP, households will not have to generate expected 
θG; they need only observe the decisions of the central bank.  
 Of course, people cannot directly observe the value of θG – θP, but they can observe 
the response of the central bank to θG – θP. An independent central bank will raise interest rates 
if it judges that θG – θP > 0. Households can then adjust their expectations accordingly. 
 
B2.4.2  Guaranteed θG = θP 
If the central bank is sufficiently independent and capable, and successfully controls θG, then it 
is not even necessary for households to generate an expected value for θG – θP because, in this 
case, θG will also equal θP. As discussed in Section B1.6, if the central bank is sufficiently 
independent and capable, then cˆ = 1 in equation (B2) and thereby, by equations (B4) and (B5), 
θG = θP. The central bank ensures that rationality always prevails over preference with regard to 
the RTP of government. If the independence of the central bank is very credible, households 
will always expect that θG = θP at all times in the future.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
C1  The representative household in dynamic models 
C1.1  The assumption of the representative household 
The concept of the representative household is a necessity in macroeconomic studies. It is used 
as a matter of course, but its theoretical foundation is fragile. The representative household has 
been used given the assumption that all households are identical or that there exists one specific 
individual household, the actions of which are always average among households (I call such a 
household “the average household” in Appendix C). The assumption that all households are 
identical seems to be too strict; therefore, it is usually assumed explicitly or implicitly that the 
representative household is the average household. However, the average household can exist 
only under very strict conditions. Antonelli (1886) showed that the existence of an average 
household requires that all households have homothetic and homogeneous utility functions. This 
type of utility function is not usually assumed in macroeconomic studies because it is very 
restrictive and unrealistic. If more general utility functions are assumed, however, the 
assumption of the representative household as the average household is inconsistent with the 
assumptions underlying the utility functions.  
 Nevertheless, the assumption of the representative household has been widely used, 
probably because it has been believed that the representative household can be interpreted as an 
approximation of the average household. Particularly in static models, the representative 
household can be seen to approximate the average household. However, in dynamic models, it 
is hard to accept the representative household as an approximation of the average household 
because, if RTPs of households are heterogeneous, there is no steady state where all of the 
optimality conditions of the heterogeneous households are satisfied (Becker, 1980). Therefore, 
macroeconomic studies using dynamic models are fallacious if the representative household is 
assumed to approximate the average household.  
 
C1.2  The representative household in static models 
Static models are usually used to analyze comparative statics. If the average household is 
represented by one specific unique household for any static state, there will be no problem in 
assuming the representative household as an approximation of the average household. Even 
though the average household is not always represented by one specific unique household in 
some states, if the average household is always represented by a household in a set of 
households that are very similar in preferences and other features, then the representative 
household assumption can be used to approximate the average household.  
 Suppose, for simplicity, that households are heterogeneous such that they are identical 
except for a particular preference. Because of the heterogeneous preference, household 
consumption varies. However, levels of consumption will not be distributed randomly because 
the distribution of consumption will correspond to the distribution of the preference. The 
consumption of a household that has a very different preference from the average will be very 
different from the average household consumption. Conversely, it is likely that the consumption 
of a household that has the average preference will nearly have the average consumption. In 
addition, the order of the degree of consumption will be almost unchanged for any static state 
because the order of the degree of the preference does not change for the given state.   
 If the order of consumption is unchanged for any given static state, it is likely that the 
household with consumption that is closest to the average consumption will also always be a 
household belonging to a group of households that have very similar preferences. Hence, it is 
possible to argue that, approximately, one specific unique household’s consumption is always 
average for any static state. Of course, it is possible to show evidence that is counter to this 
argument, particularly in some special situations, but it is likely that this conjecture is usually 
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true in normal situations, and the assumption that the representative household approximates the 
average household is acceptable in static models. 
 
C1.3  The representative household in dynamic models 
In dynamic models, however, the story is more complicated. In particular, heterogeneous RTPs 
pose a serious problem. This problem is easily understood in a dynamic model with exogenous 
technology (i.e., a Ramsey growth model). Suppose that households are heterogeneous in RTP, 
degree of risk aversion (ε), and productivity of the labor they provide. Suppose also for 
simplicity that there are many “economies” in a country, and an economy consists of a 
household and a firm. The household provides labor to the firm in the particular economy, and 
the firm’s level of technology (A) varies depending on the productivity of labor that the 
household in its economy provides. Economies trade with each other: that is, the entire economy 
of a country consists of many individual small economies that trade with each other.  
 A household maximizes its expected utility,    dtθtcuE t 

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Therefore, at steady state, the heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion (ε) is irrelevant, and 
the heterogeneity in productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances among 
economies because 
t
t
k
y


in all economies is kept equal by market arbitrage. Hence, 
heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion and productivity does not matter at steady state. 
Therefore, the same logic as that used for static models can be applied. Approximately, one 
specific unique household’s consumption is always average for any time in dynamic models, 
even if the degree of risk aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. Thus, the assumption 
of the representative household is also acceptable in dynamic models even if the degree of risk 
aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. 
 However, equation (C1) clearly indicates that heterogeneity in RTP is problematic. As 
Becker (1980) shows, if RTP is heterogeneous, the household that has the lowest RTP will 
eventually possess all capital. With heterogeneous RTPs, there is no steady state where all 
households achieve all of their optimality conditions. In addition, the household with 
consumption that is average at present has a very different RTP from the household with 
consumption that is average in the distant future. The consumption of a household that has the 
average RTP will initially be almost average, but in the future the household with the lowest 
RTP will be the one with consumption that is almost average. That is, the consumption path of 
the household that presently has average consumption is notably different from that of the 
household with average consumption in the future. Therefore, any individual household cannot 
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be almost average in any period and thus cannot even approximate the average household. As a 
result, even if the representative household is assumed in a dynamic model, its discounted 
expected utility    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
 is meaningless, and analyses based on it are 
fallacious.  
  If we assume that RTP is identical for all households, the above problem is solved. 
However, this solution is still problematic because that assumption is not merely expedient for 
the sake of simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to allow for an assumed representative 
household. Therefore, the rationale for identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs are actually and universally observed. RTP is, however, 
unquestionably not identical among households. Hence, it is difficult to accept the 
representative household assumption in dynamic models based on the assumption of identical 
RTP. 
 The conclusion that the representative household assumption in dynamic models is 
meaningless and leads to fallacious results is very important, because a huge number of studies 
have used the representative household assumption in dynamic models. To solve this severe 
problem, an alternative interpretation or definition of the representative household is needed. 
 Note that in an endogenous growth model the situation is even more complicated. 
Because a heterogeneous degree of risk aversion also matters, the assumption of the 
representative household is more difficult to accept, so an alternative interpretation or definition 
is even more important when endogenous growth models are used. 
 
C2  Sustainable heterogeneity 
C2.1  The model 
Suppose that two heterogeneous economies―economy 1 and economy 2—are identical except 
for their RTPs. Households within each economy are assumed to be identical for simplicity. The 
population growth rate is zero. The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, 
and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in Appendix C. 
 RTP of household in economy 1 is 
1θ  and that in economy 2 is θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The 
production function in economy 1 is  ,t
α
,t kfAy 11   and that in economy 2 is 
 ,t
α
,t kfAy 22  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, output and capital per capita in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; A is technology; and α  10  α  is a constant. The population of each 
economy is 
2
L
; thus, the total for both is L, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and that in economy 2 is –τt. The 
production functions are specified as  
 
  
α
ti,
α
i,t kAy
 1  ; 
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thus,    2,11,, 
 iALKY
αα
titi
. Because A is given exogenously, this model is an exogenous 
technology model (Ramsey growth model). The examination of sustainable heterogeneity based 
on an endogenous growth model is shown in Harashima (2014a).  
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration, such that  
 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1





 .                            (C2) 
 
Because equation (C2) always holds through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1  , and tt yy ,2,1    also hold.  
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Because 
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represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. 
Hence,  
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is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
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is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  
 
  
 ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in the 
activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends on capital inputs, such that  
 
  ,tt
kgg 1  ,
 
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
  ,t,tt
kgkgg 21   . 
 
 Each household in economy 1 therefore maximizes its expected utility 
 
  
   dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

 , 
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subject to 
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t
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α
,t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk 1
0
11
1
1,1 1  
  ,            (C3) 
 
and each household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
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where ui,t and ci,t, respectively, are the utility function and per capita consumption in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; and E is the expectation operator. Equations (C3) and (C4) implicitly 
assume that each economy does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 
C2.2  Sustainable heterogeneity without government intervention 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all of the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. First, the natures of the model when the 
government does not intervene (i.e., 0g ) are examined. The growth rate of consumption in 
economy 1 is 
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By equations (C5) and (C6),  
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If equation (C7) holds, all of the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely 
satisfied. The state indicated by equation (C7) is called the “multilateral steady state” or 
“multilateral state” in the following discussion. By procedures similar to those used for the 
endogenous growth model in Harashima (2014a), the condition of the multilateral steady state 
for H economies that are identical except for their RTPs is shown as  
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for any i, where i = 1, 2, … , H. 
 Because  
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that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
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in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. Because of the debts, the consumption of economy 1 is 
smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under the condition of sustainable heterogeneity.  
 Note that many empirical studies conclude that RTP is negatively correlated with 
income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). Suppose that, in addition to the 
heterogeneity in RTP (θ1 < θ2), the productivity of economy 1 is higher than that of economy 2. 
At steady state, the consumption of economy 1 would be larger than that of economy 2 as a 
result of the heterogeneity in productivity. However, as a result of the heterogeneity in RTP, the 
consumption of economy 1 is smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable 
heterogeneity. Which effect prevails will depend on differences in the degrees of heterogeneity. 
For example, if the difference in productivity is relatively large whereas that in RTP is relatively 
small, the effect of the productivity difference will prevail and the consumption of economy 1 
will be larger than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable heterogeneity.  
 
C3  An alternative definition of the representative household 
C3.1  The definition 
Section C2 indicates that, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all heterogeneous 
households are connected (in the sense that all households behave by considering other 
households’ optimality) and appear to be behaving collectively as a combined supra-household 
that unites all households, as equations (C7) and (C8) indicate. The supra-household is unique 
and its behavior is time-consistent. Its actions always and consistently represent those of all 
households. Considering these natures of households under sustainable heterogeneity, I present 
the following alternative definition of the representative household: “the behavior of the 
representative household is defined as the collective behavior of all households under 
sustainable heterogeneity.” 
 Even if households are heterogeneous, they can be represented by a representative 
household as defined above. Unlike the representative household defined as the average 
household, the collective representative household reaches a steady state where all households 
satisfy all of their optimality conditions in dynamic models. In addition, this representative 
household has a RTP that is equal to the average RTP as shown in equations (C7) and (C8).9 
                                                          
9 If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved with the help of the government’s intervention, the time preference rate of 
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Hence, we can assume not only a representative household but also that its RTP is the average 
rate of all households.  
 
C3.2  Universality of sustainable heterogeneity 
An important point, however, is that this alternatively defined representative household can be 
used in dynamic models only if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, but this condition is not 
necessarily always naturally satisfied. Sustainable heterogeneity is achieved only if households 
with lower RTPs behave multilaterally or the government appropriately intervenes. Therefore, 
the representative household assumption is not necessarily naturally acceptable in dynamic 
models unless it is confirmed that sustainable heterogeneity is usually achieved in an economy.  
 Notwithstanding this flaw, the representative household assumption has been widely 
used in many macroeconomic studies that use dynamic models. Furthermore, these studies have 
been little criticized for using the inappropriate representative household assumption. In 
addition, in most economies, the dire state that Becker (1980) predicts has not been observed 
even though RTPs of households are unquestionably heterogeneous. These facts conversely 
indicate that sustainable heterogeneity―probably with government interventions―has been 
usually and universally achieved across economies and time periods. In a sense, these facts are 
indirect evidence that sustainable heterogeneity usually prevails in economies.  
 Note that because the representative household’s behavior in dynamic models is 
represented by the collective behavior of all households under sustainable heterogeneity, RH’s 
RTP is not intrinsically known to households, but they do need to have an expected rate. Each 
household intrinsically knows its own preferences, but it does not intrinsically know the 
collective preference of all households. Therefore, in dynamic models, it must be assumed that 
all households do not ex ante know RH’s RTP, but households estimate it from information on 
the behaviors of other households and the government.  
 
C4  NEED FOR AN EXPECTED RTP RH 
C4.1  The behavior of household 
Achieving sustainable heterogeneity affects the behavior of the individual household because 
sustainable heterogeneity indicates that each household must consider the other households’ 
optimality (as well as the behavior of the government, if necessary). This feature does not mean 
that households behave cooperatively with other households. Each household behaves 
non-cooperatively based on its own RTP, but at the same time, it behaves considering whether 
the other households’ optimality conditions are achieved or not. This consideration affects the 
actions a household takes in that it affects the choice of a household’s initial consumption. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity indicates that a household’s future path of consumption has 
to be consistent with the future path of sustainable heterogeneity. Thereby, a household sets its 
initial consumption such that it will proceed on the path that is consistent with the path of 
sustainable heterogeneity and eventually reach a steady state. 
 
C4.2  Deviation from sustainable heterogeneity 
C4.2.1  Political elements 
What happens if a household deviates from sustainable heterogeneity? A deviation means that a 
household sets its initial consumption at a level that is not consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity. For less advantaged households (i.e., households with higher RTPs), the only 
way to satisfy all of their optimality conditions is to set their initial consumption consistent with 
sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore, they will not take the initiative to deviate. In contrast, the 
most advantaged households (i.e., those with the lowest RTP) can satisfy all of their optimality 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the representative household will not be exactly equal to the average rate of time preference. 
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conditions even if they set initial consumption independent of sustainable heterogeneity. The 
incentive for the most advantaged household to select a multilateral path will be weak because 
the growth rate of the most advantaged household on the multilateral path is lower than that on 
the unilateral path. 
 When economy 1 selects the unilateral path, does economy 2 quietly accept the 
unfavorable consequences shown in Becker (1980)? From an economic perspective, the optimal 
response of economy 2 is the one shown in Harashima (2010): economy 2 should behave as a 
follower and accept the unfavorable consequences. However, if other factors—particularly 
political ones—are taken into account, the response of economy 2 will be different. Faced with 
a situation in which all the optimality conditions cannot be satisfied, it is highly likely that 
economy 2 would politically protest and resist economy 1. It should be emphasized economy 2 
is not responsible for its own non-optimality, which is a result of economy 1’s unilateral 
behavior in a heterogeneous population. Economy 2 may overlook the non-optimality if it is 
temporary, but it will not if it is permanent. As shown in Harashima (2010), the non-optimality 
is permanent, it is quite likely that economy 2 will seriously resist economy 1 politically.  
 If economy 1 could achieve its optimality only on the unilateral path, economy 1 
would counter the resistance of economy 2, but this is not the case. Because of this, economy 
2’s demand does not necessarily appear to be unreasonable or selfish. Faced with the protest and 
resistance by economy 2, economy 1 may compromise or cooperate with economy 2 and select 
the multilateral path. 
 
C4.2.2  Resistance 
The main objective of economy 2 is to force economy 1 to select the multilateral path and to 
establish sustainable heterogeneity. This objective may be achieved through cooperative 
measures, non-violent civil disobedience (e.g., trade restrictions), or other more violent means. 
Restricting or abolishing trade between the two economies will cost economy 1 
because it necessitates a restructuring of the division of labor, and the restructuring will not be 
confined to a small scale. Large-scale adjustments will develop that involve all levels of divided 
labor, because they are all correlated with each other. For example, if an important industry had 
previously existed only in one economy, owing to a division of labor, and trade between the two 
economies was no longer permitted, the other economy would have to establish this industry 
while also maintaining other industries. As a result, economy 1 would incur non-negligible costs. 
More developed economies have more complicated and sophisticated divisions of labor, and 
restructuring costs from the disruption of trade will be much higher in developed economies. In 
addition, more resources will need to be allocated to the generation of technology because 
technology will also no longer be traded. Finally, all of the conventional benefits of trade will be 
lost. Trade is beneficial because of the heterogeneous endowment of resources, as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem shows. Because goods and services are assumed to be uniform in the 
models presented in Appendix C, the benefits of trade are implicit in the models. However, in 
the real word, resources such as oil and other raw materials are unevenly distributed, so a 
disruption or restriction of trade will substantially damage economic activities on both national 
and international levels. 
 The damage done by trade restrictions has an upper limit, however, because the 
restructuring of the division of labor, additional resource allocation to innovation, and loss of 
trade benefits are all finite. Therefore, in some cases, particularly if economies are not 
sufficiently developed and division of labor is not complex, the damage caused will be 
relatively small. Hence, a disruption of trade (non-violent civil disobedience in the national 
models) may not be sufficiently effective as a means of resistance under some these conditions. 
In some cases, harassment, sabotage, intimidation, and violence may be used, whether 
legal or illegal. In extreme cases, war or revolution could ensue. In such cases, economy 1 will 
be substantially damaged in many ways and be unable to achieve optimality. The resistance and 
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resulting damages will continue until sustainability is established. 
 In any case, the objective of economy 2’s resistance conversely implies that 
establishing sustainability eliminates the risk and cost of political and social instability. The 
resistance of economy 2 will lower the desire of economy 1 to select the unilateral path. 
 
C4.2.3  United economies 
An important countermeasure to the fragility of sustainable heterogeneity for less advantaged 
economies is the formation of a union of economies. If economies other than economy 1 are 
united by commonly selecting the multilateral path within them, their power to resist economy 1 
will be substantially enhanced. Consider the multi-economy model shown in Harashima (2010). 
If the economies do not form a union, the power to resist the unilateral actions of economy 1 is 
divided and limited to the power of each individual economy. However, if the economies are 
united, the power to resist economy 1 increases. If a sufficient number of economies unite, the 
multilateral path will almost certainly be selected by economy 1. 
 To maintain the union, any economy in the union should have the explicit and 
resolved intention of selecting the multilateral path within the union, even if it is relatively more 
advantaged within the union. To demand that relatively more advantaged economies select the 
multilateral path, less advantaged economies themselves must also select the multilateral path in 
any case. Otherwise, less advantaged economies will be divided and ruled by more advantaged 
economies. For all heterogeneous people to happily coexist, all of them should behave 
multilaterally. At the same time, Harashima (2010) indicates that the more advantaged an 
economy is, the more modestly it should behave, i.e., the more it should restrain itself from 
accumulating extra capitals. 
 In general, therefore, the most advantaged (the lowest RTP) household will be forced 
to set its initial consumption consistent with sustainable heterogeneity. 
 
C4.3  Need for an expected RTP RH 
Because all households need to set their initial consumption consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity to achieve it, households must calculate the path of sustainable heterogeneity 
before setting their initial consumption levels. To calculate this level, each household first must 
know the value of RTP RH. However, although a household naturally knows the value of its 
own RTP, it does not intrinsically know the value of RTP RH. To know this, a household would 
have to know the values of all of the other households’ RTPs. Hence, the expected value of RTP 
RH must somehow be generated utilizing all other relevant available information. The necessity 
of an expected RTP RH is critically important because RTP plays a crucial role as the discount 
factor in dynamic models. 
 Note that, if we assume that RTP is identical for all households, an expected RTP RH 
is no longer needed because any household’s own RTP is equal to the RTP RH. This solution is 
still problematic, however, because the assumption is not merely expedient for the sake of 
simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to eliminate the need for an expected RTP RH. 
Therefore, any rationale for assuming identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs do exist and are universally observed. However, RTP is 
unquestionably not identical among households. Therefore, households must use expected 
values of RTP RH. 
 
C5  The RTP model 
C5.1  Need to know the structural model  
If RTP RH is a constant parameter, as has been long and widely assumed, the need for an 
expected RTP RH would not be a serious problem. The historical mean of an unchanging RTP 
RH could be estimated relatively precisely based on long-term data of various economic 
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indicators even if the structural model remained unknown. The RTP RH could be specified as 
the RTP that is most consistent with long-term trends of the indicators. 
 Although RTP has been treated as a constant parameter in many studies, this feature 
has not been demonstrated either empirically or theoretically. Rather, the assumption is merely 
expedient for the sake of simplicity. There is another practical reason for this treatment: models 
with a permanently constant RTP exhibit excellent tractability (see Samuelson, 1937). However, 
some have argued that it is natural to view RTP as temporally variable, and the concept of a 
temporally varying RTP has a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More 
recently, Lawrance (1991) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit 
permanently constant RTPs by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation 
of RTPs. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change RTP. Models of 
endogenous RTP have been presented, the most familiar of which is Uzawa’s (1968) model. 
 If the RTP RH is temporally variable, its future stream must be expected by 
households, and a rational expectation is a model-consistent expectation. To generate rational 
expectations of RTP RH, therefore, the structural model of the RTP RH (i.e., equations that 
fundamentally describe how it is endogenously formed) needs to be known. 
 
C5.2  Endogenous RTP models 
C5.2.1 Uzawa’s (1968) model 
The most well-known endogenous RTP model is that of Uzawa (1968). It has been applied in 
many analyses (e.g., Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Obstfeld, 
1990). However, Uzawa’s model has not necessarily been regarded as a realistic expression of 
the endogeneity of RTP because it has a serious drawback in that impatience increases as 
income, consumption, and utility increase. The basic structure of Uzawa’s model is 
 
    tt cuθθ
  , 
  
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  , 
 
in which RTP in period t (θt) is temporally variable and an increasing function of present utility 
u(ct) where ct is consumption in period t. The condition 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is necessary for the model 
to be stable. This property is quite controversial and difficult to accept a priori because many 
empirical studies have indicated that RTP is negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance, 1991); thus, many economists are critical of Uzawa’s model. Epstein (1987), 
however, discussed the plausibility of increasing impatience and offered some 
counter-arguments. However, his view is in the minority, and most economists support 
arguments in favor of a decreasing RTP, such that 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. Hence, although Uzawa’s 
model attracted some attention, the analysis of the endogeneity of RTP has progressed very little. 
Although Uzawa’s model may be flawed, it does not mean that the conjecture that RTP is 
influenced by future income, consumption, and utility is fallacious. Rather, it means that an 
appropriate model in which RTP is negatively correlated with income, consumption, and utility 
has not been presented. 
 
C5.2.2 Size effect on impatience 
The problem of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  in Uzawa’s model arises because distant future levels of 
consumption have little influence on factors that form RTP; that is, RTP is formed only with the 
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information on present consumption, and it must be revised every period in accordance with 
consumption growth. However, there is no a priori reason why information on distant future 
activities should be far less important than the information on the present and near future 
activities. Fisher (1930) argued that 
 
[O]ur first step, then, is to show how a person’s impatience depends on the size 
of his income, assuming the other three conditions to remain constant; for, 
evidently, it is possible that two incomes may have the same time shape, 
composition and risk, and yet differ in size, one being, say, twice the other in 
every period of time. 
 In general, it may be said that, other things being equal, the smaller the 
income, the higher the preference for the present over the future income. It is 
true of course that a permanently small income implies a keen appreciation of 
wants as well as of immediate wants. … But it increases the want for immediate 
income even more than it increases the want for future income. (p. 72) 
 
According to Fisher’s (1930) view, a force that influences RTP is a psychological response 
derived from the perception of the “size of the entire income or utility stream.” This view 
indicates that it is necessary to probe how people perceive the size of the entire income or utility 
stream. 
 Little effort has been directed toward probing the nature of the size of the utility or 
income stream on RTP, although numerous psychological experiments have been performed 
with regard to the anomalies of the expected utility model with a constant RTP (e.g., Frederick 
et al., 2002). Analyses using endogenous RTP models so far have merely introduced the a priori 
assumption of endogeneity of RTP without explaining the reasoning for doing so in detail. 
Hence, even now, Fisher’s (1930) insights are very useful for the examination of the size effect. 
An important point in Fisher’s quote is that the size of the infinite utility stream is perceived as 
“permanently” high or low. The size difference among the utility streams may be perceived as 
a permanently continuing difference of utilities among different utility streams. Anticipation of 
a permanently higher utility may enhance an emotional sense of well-being because people feel 
they are in a long-lasting secure situation, which will generate a positive psychological response 
and make people more patient. If that is true, distant future utilities should be taken into account 
equally with present utility. Otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish whether the difference of 
utilities will continue permanently. 
 From this point of view, the specification that only the present utility influences the 
formation of RTP, as is the case of Uzawa’s model, is inadequate. Instead, a simple measure of 
the size where present and future utilities are summed with equal weight will be a more 
appropriate measure of the size of a utility stream.10 
 
C5.3  Model of RTP11 
C5.3.1  The model 
The representative household solves the maximization problem as shown in Section C1.3. 
Taking the arguments in Section C5.2 into account, the “size” of the infinite utility stream can 
be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1: The size of the utility stream W for a given technology A is 
                                                          
10 Das (2003) showed another stable endogenous time preference model with decreasing impatience. Her model is 
stable, although the rate of time preference is decreasing because endogenous impatience is almost constant. In this 
sense, the situation her model describes is very special. 
11 The idea of this type of endogenous time preference model was originally presented in Harashima (2004a). 
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where E is the expectation operator, and 
 
 
T
tρ
1
  if Tt 0  
                              0tρ   otherwise.    
 
 tρ  indicates weights and has the same value in any period. Thus, the weights for the 
evaluation of future utilities are distributed evenly over time, as discussed in Section C5.2. 
 To this point, technology A has been assumed to be constant. If A is temporally 
variable (At) and grows at a constant rate and the economy is on a balanced growth path such 
that At, yt, kt, and ct grow at the same rate, then the definition of W needs to be modified because 
any stream of ct and u(ct) grows to infinity. It is then impossible to distinguish the sizes of the 
utility stream by simply summing up ct as T  as shown in Definition 1. Because 
balanced growth is possible only when technological progress is Harrod neutral, I assume a 
Harrod neutral production function such that 
 
    1ttt kωAy  , 
 
where  10   and  ωω 0  are constants. To distinguish the sizes of utility stream, 
the following value is set as the standard stream of utility, 
 
   ψtecu ~  , 
 
where  cc ~0~   is a constant and  ψψ 0  is a constant rate of growth. Streams of utility can 
be compared with this standard stream. If a constant relative risk aversion utility function is 
assumed, a stream of utility can be compared with the standard stream of utility as follows: 
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By using this ratio, a given stream of utility can be distinguished from the standard stream of 
utility. That is, the size of a utility stream W for a given stream of technology At that grows at 
the same rate ψ as yt, kt, and ct can be alternatively defined as 
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Clearly, if ψ = 0, then the size (W) degenerates into the one shown in Definition 1. 
 If there is a steady state such that 
 
  E
t 
lim      *t cuEcu   , 
 
or for the case of expected balanced growth, 
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where c* is a constant and indicates steady-state consumption, then 
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for the following reason. Because      
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In addition, 
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Hence,    cuEW ; that is, RTP is determined by steady-state consumption (c*). 
 The RTP model presented in Appendix C is constructed on the basis of this measure of 
W. An essential property that must be incorporated into the model is that RTP is sensitive to, 
and a function of, W such that 
 
   Wθθ   , 
 
where  Wθ   is monotonically continuous and continuously differentiable. Because W is a 
sum of utilities, this property simply reflects the core idea of an endogenous RTP. However, this 
property is new in the sense that RTP is sensitive not only to the present utility but also to the 
entire stream of utility, that is, the size of the utility stream represented by the utility of 
steady-state consumption. This property is intuitively acceptable because it is likely that people 
set their principles or parameters for their behaviors considering the final consequences of their 
behavior (i.e., the steady state; see, e.g., Barsky and Sims, 2012). 
 Another essential property that must be incorporated into the model is 
 
  0
dW
dθ
 . 
 
Because    cuEW  and  
t
t
dc
cdu
0 , RTP is inversely proportionate to c*. This property is 
consistent with the findings in many empirical studies, which have shown that RTP is 
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negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991). 
 In summary, the basic structure of the model is: 
 
         cuEθWθθ  , 
   0 cudE
dθ
dW
dθ
 .                        (C9) 
 
This model is deceptively similar to Uzawa’s endogenous RTP model and simply replaces ct 
with c* and 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  with    0cudE
dθ
. However, the two models are completely 
different because of the opposite characteristics of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  and    0cudE
dθ
. 
 
C5.3.2  Nature of the model 
The model can be regarded as successful only if it exhibits stability. In Uzawa’s model, the 
economy becomes unstable if 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is replaced with 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. In this section, I 
examine the stability of the model. 
 
C5.3.2.1  Equilibrium RTP 
In Ramsey-type models, such as shown in Section C1.3, if a constant RTP is given, the value of 
the marginal product of capital (i.e., the value of the real interest rate) converges to that of the 
given RTP as the economy approaches the steady state. Hence, when a RTP is specified at a 
certain value, the corresponding expected steady-state consumption is uniquely determined. 
Given fixed values of other exogenous parameters, any predetermined RTP has unique values of 
expected consumption and utility at steady state. There is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the expected utilities at steady state and the RTPs; therefore, the expected utility at steady state 
can be expressed as a function of RTP. Let 

xc  be a set of steady-state consumption levels, 
given a set of RTPs (θx) and other fixed exogenous parameters. The concept of θ → W 
discussed above can be described as 
 
     WcuEθg    ,                       (C10) 
 
where  xcc  and xθθ . On the other hand, RTP is a continuous function of steady-state 
consumption as shown in equation (C9) such that        cuEθWθθ . The 
reverse function is 
 
     WcuEθh    .                       (C11) 
 
 The equilibrium RTP is determined by the point of intersection of the two functions, 
 θg  and  θh , as shown in Figure C1. Figure C2 shows the special but conventionally 
assumed case for  θh  in which θ is not sensitive to W, and RTP is constant. There exists a 
point of intersection because both  θg  and  θh  are monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 θh  is monotonically continuous because  Wθ   is monotonically continuous.  θg  is 
monotonically continuous because, as a result of utility maximization,    k fc  and 
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k  is capital input per capita at steady state such that  t
t
kk

  lim . 
Because  k f  and  


dk
kdf 
 are monotonically continuous for 0k , c* is a 
monotonically continuous function of θ for 0θ . Here, because u is monotonically 
continuous, then     θgcuE   is also monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 The function      WcuEθg    is a decreasing function of θ because higher RTP 
results in lower steady state consumption. The function      WcuEθh    is also a 
decreasing function of θ because 0
dW
dθ
. Thus, both  θg  and  θh  are decreasing, but 
the slope of  θh  is steeper than that of  θg  as shown in Figure C1. This is true because 
  Wθg  is the consequence of a Ramsey-type model as shown in Section C1.3; thus, if 
θ , then   0Wθg  because  tiθ  and 0tk , and if 0θ , then 
  Wθg  because 0 tiθ  and tk . The function   Wθh  indicates the 
endogeneity of RTP, and because RTP is usually neither zero nor infinity, then even if 
  0Wθh , θ , and   Wθh , θ0 . Hence, the locus   Wθh  cuts the 
locus   Wθg   downward from the top, as shown in Figure C1. Hence, the locus   Wθh   
is more vertical than   Wθg  , and thereby  a permanently constant RTP, as shown in Figure 
C2, has probably been used as an approximation of the locus   Wθh  for simplicity.  
 
C5.3.2.2  Stability of the model 
RTP is constant unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs because W does not depend 
on t but on the expected c*. Thus, the same RTP and steady state continue until such a shock 
hits the economy. Therefore, the endogeneity of RTP only matters when a shock occurs. This 
constancy is the key for the stability of the model. Once the RTP corresponding to the 
intersection (Fig. 1) is determined, it is constant and the economy converges at a unique steady 
state unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs. The shock is exogenous to the model, 
and the economy does not explode endogenously but stabilizes at the steady state. Hence, the 
property 0
dW
dθ
 in the model, which is consistent with empirical findings, does not cause 
instability. 
 The model is therefore acceptable as a model of endogenous RTP. Furthermore, 
because RTP is endogenously determined, the assumption of irrationality is not necessary for 
the determination of RTP. Nevertheless, a shock on RTP can be initiated by a shock on the 
expected c*; thus, even if the so-called animal spirits are directly irrelevant to determination of 
RTP, they may be relevant in the generation of shocks on the expected c*. 
 
C6  FREQUENT RTP SHOCKS 
C6.1  Difficulty in knowing RTP RH  
To estimate the parameter values of equation (C11) in the structural model of RTP RH, it is 
necessary to obtain a sufficiently large amount of data on the value of RTP RH. To obtain these 
data, a household must know the RTPs of all the other households. Although a household knows 
its own RTP, it has almost no information about the RTPs of all the other households much less 
time-series data on each household’s RTP. Because of the lack of available data, a household 
cannot estimate the parameter values in equation (C11) in the structural model of RTP RH even 
if it knows the functional forms of equations in the structural model.  
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We can easily generate data on aggregate consumption, investment, production, 
inflation, trade, and other factors at a relatively low cost, but we cannot directly observe the 
value of RTP RH. Nonetheless, many estimates of RTP have been reported, but they are not 
based on a structural model of RTP. Most are the results of experimental studies or indirect 
estimates based on other models (e.g., Ramsey growth models) on the assumption that RTP is 
constant. Experiments can give us some information on the RTPs of test subjects, but we should 
not naively use these estimates as the RTP RH in the calculation of the future path of economy 
because they vary widely according to the experimental environments. Furthermore, most of the 
indirect estimates were calculated on the assumption that RTP is constant, which as discussed 
previously, is most likely not the case. The basic problem is that no credible estimation method 
of RTP RH has been established. 
 
C6.2  Expectations based on beliefs 
The lack of observable data on RTP RH will significantly hinder households from generating 
rational expectations of the future path of economy. How do households rationally expect their 
future streams of consumption and production and calculate their optimal paths without 
information on RTP RH, which is indispensable as the discount factor? The historical mean of 
RTP RH estimated by long-term data is not consistent with a rational expectation of the future 
stream because RTP is not constant. Without a reliable method for estimating the parameters of 
the structural model, it is impossible for households to generate rational expectations of the 
future path of the economy. 
 An alternative way of estimating expected values of RTP RH is needed, but even if an 
alternative method is utilized, households still have to behave as rationally as possible even in 
an environment of significantly incomplete information. In this situation, household may have 
to use the concept of bounded rationality to make decisions. It is possible that the only 
alternative for a household is to use its “belief” about the RTP RH. The use of a belief does not 
mean that households deviate from rationality; rather, it is the most rational behavior they can 
use in an environment where insufficient information is available. 
 Such a belief is defined in Appendix C as the range of values of RTP RH within which 
a household believes that the true RTP RH exists. Households utilize the belief in place of 
equation (C11). More specifically, suppose that household i ( Ni ) believes that the RTP RH 
in the future is situated in the range λi, where the subjective probability density at any point on λi 
is identical (i.e., its distribution shape is uniform). Because households have no information 
about the shape of the distribution, they assume that it is uniform. This supposition means that 
household i believes that λi is stationary. Let iλ be the mean of λi. Suppose that household i 
calculates its optimal future path on the belief that the mean of future values of RTP RH is
iλ . 
By equation (C10), W can be calculated based on 
iλ , and the expected future path of economy 
can be calculated. 
 Households can equally access all relevant information. Therefore, if the belief of a 
household is very different from those of the majority, the household will soon perceive that its 
belief is different, through observing the behavior of majority. The household will change its 
belief to the almost same as those of the majority because otherwise it cannot achieve optimality 
as expected on the assumption that sustainable heterogeneity is achieved. Hence, it is likely that 
households’ beliefs become similar, and thereby, it is assumed for simplicity that households’ 
beliefs are identical.  
 Note that households do not cooperatively and collectively expect the future path of 
economy (i.e., the representative household’s future path), but each household independently 
and individually generates its own expectations based on its belief in RTP RH. The household 
thereby creates its own expected future path considering the expected representative 
household’s future path. The aggregates are the sum of all household’s independent and 
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individual activities, but if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, the aggregates appear to be the 
same as the results of the representative household’s activities. 
 
C6.3  Refining beliefs 
A household knows that its expectation is based on its beliefs and not the structural model. 
Therefore, it will always want to refine the belief, that is, raise the probability that the belief is 
the correct value, by exploiting all currently available relevant information. Let a set of 
currently available economic indicators be It (e.g., the observed data on consumption, 
production, inventory, etc.). These data may provide some useful information on the past RTP 
RH, and a household may refine its belief based on this information. These data and equation 
(C10) can be used to generate estimates of past values of RTP RH. However, It includes noise, 
and data in It will usually be somewhat inconsistent between the elements of It. In addition, 
because equation (C10) indicates the steady state values that are achieved after a long-period 
transition, the short-term past data included in It are basically insufficient to obtain a credible 
estimate. Therefore, the estimate of the past values of RTP RH based on It and equation (C10) 
will usually have a large confidence interval. Let 
Iμ  be the estimated past RTP RH and μI be 
its confidence interval of, for example, 95%. Because households can equally access all relevant 
information, assume for simplicity that μI and Iμ are identical for all households. 
 Although a household knows that 
Iμ  is not a credible estimate, has a large 
confidence interval, and is merely an estimate (usually a point estimate) of a past value, it will 
strive to utilize the information derived from
Iμ to refine its beliefs in the future value of RTP 
RH. Usually
Iμ will not be equal to iλ , but the ranges of λi and μI may partly overlap. Household 
i may utilize the information from this partial overlap to refine its belief (i.e., information of 
how λi is different from μI). iI λμ   indicates that the belief iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both 
are wrong, or both are right if the true past RTP RH is
Iμ but the true future RTP RH is iλ . The 
belief 
iλ  may be wrong because the RTP RH will change in the near future, and Iμ may be 
wrong because the RTP RH changed during the period in which the data were obtained. In 
addition, a household knows that μI is the result of all households’ activities based on their 
beliefs, not on the true value of RTP RH. These uncertainties arise because households cannot 
know the parameters of the structural model. Without using the structural model, household i 
cannot judge whether 
iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both are wrong, or both are right. As a result, 
household i will not easily adjust its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 However, it is still likely that information about the difference between λi and μI can be 
used to refine the belief. To extract the useful information, the following rules may be used:  
 
Rule 1: if 
Iμ is included in λi, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 2: if 
iλ is included in μI, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 3: if λi and μI overlap at or above a specified ratio, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the 
belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 
The above rules may be seen as a type of adaptive expectation because μI indicates the past RTP 
RH. However, in the situation where the parameters of the structural model of the RTP RH are 
unknown, it may be seen as rational to utilize the information contained in μI by adopting one of 
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these rules. 
 
C6.4  Changing beliefs 
However, it does not seem likely that a household will refine its belief following one of the rules 
shown above because the rules are basically backward looking and will not be adopted as a tool 
for refining the belief if a household is convinced that the RTP RH is temporally variable. The 
belief will only be changed if forward-looking information is available, that is, when a 
household becomes aware of information about the future RTP RH in μI. For example, the 
difference between λi and μI may reflect an unexpected and large positive technology shock that 
occurred after the formation of belief λi. Because the effects of the technology shock will persist 
for long periods in the future, household i will most likely change its belief. In this case, a 
household will not simply refine its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ ; it will change to another value that 
is formed as an entirely new belief. 
 Whether a household changes its belief or not, therefore, will depend not simply on μI 
but on the information the household can extract from μI about the future path of the economy. 
Hence, in some cases, a household will change its belief when new values of μI are obtained, but 
in other cases, it will not, depending on how the household interprets the information contained 
in μI. 
 
C6.5  Heuristics 
When a household interprets μI, it may also use heuristic methods, for example, a simplified 
linear reduced form model of RTP RH. Studies of the use of heuristics and bounded rationality 
in this context would be useful for better understanding the interpretation mechanism of μI. 
There are many possible simplified linear reduced form models of RH’s RTP that could be used 
as heuristic methods although most of them may be ad hoc. Even though such reduced form 
models are far less credible than a structural model, they may be utilized as a heuristic method 
of interpreting μI by households. Although these types of models may often result in misleading 
conclusions, they may sometimes provide useful information. For example, if a linear 
correlation between RTP RH and a financial indicator exists, even if it is weak or temporary, 
changes in the financial indicator may contain useful information about changes in the RTP RH. 
Therefore, if a household believes that this correlation exists, it will use this information to 
interpret μI. 
 
C6.6  Frequent RTP shocks 
Households must have expected values of RTP RH for sustainable heterogeneity, but as 
previously discussed, the expectations are not based on the structural model but rather on a 
belief that is not guaranteed to generate the correct value. In addition, the belief can be 
influenced by heuristic considerations. These features indicate that the expected values of RTP 
RH will fluctuate more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH. 
 Households’ expectations of RTP RH will change when the intrinsic RTP RH shifts, 
for example, when new information about shocks on the factors that determine equation (C10) 
becomes available. For a given θ,   cuE changes if the expectation of future productivity 
changes. Productivity at the macro level will be influenced by scientific technology, financial 
technology, social infrastructure, and other factors. If expectations about these factors in the 
future changes, the expected future productivity and   cuE will also change. In addition, 
even if intrinsic RTP RH does not change, the expected RTP RH will change if a household’s 
belief is altered because of new information contained in μI. Hence, the expected RTP RH can 
change independently of intrinsic changes in RTP RH. Therefore, even if intrinsic changes in 
RTP RH occur infrequently, changes in the expected RTP RH may occur more frequently. 
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 A household’s expected RTP RH can potentially change every time new information 
on μI becomes available if it contains the information that makes beliefs change. Information 
concerning factors that affect the expected RTP RH will become available frequently, and at 
least some of the information may be both very important and unexpected. In addition, there 
will be many disturbances in the fundamental factors that affect equation (C10), and many of 
these disturbances will also cause μI to change. As discussed previously, a household may 
interpret these changes in μI as a change in the true RTP RH. Therefore, it is likely that 
households’ expected RTP RH change more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH, and thereby, 
that time preference shocks also occur more frequently than previously thought. 
 Even a small piece of additional information about the belief can significantly change 
the path of the economy. For example, if many households believe a rumor (whether it is true or 
not) related to information about the interpretation of μI and respond similarly to it, their 
expectations will be changed in the same direction by the rumor. If all households respond 
similarly to an untrue rumor and change their expectations equally to an untrue value, the 
economy will proceed based on the incorrect expectation of RTP RH. The
Iμ that is observed a 
few periods later will follow these wrongly expected values of RTP RH. Upon obtaining new 
data of 
Iμ that are consistent with these wrongly expected values, households will judge that 
their (incorrect) changes were in fact correct. As a result, the incorrect expectations become 
self-fulfilling. This spurious situation may reach an impasse at some point in the future because 
the expectations are based not on a structural model but on the (incorrect) beliefs. Households 
will not anticipate the impasse until the economy reaches it because they believe that the 
wrongly expected RTP RH (i.e., the currently held belief) is true. 
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Figure C1: Endogenous time preference 
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Figure C2: Permanently constant time preference 
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